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 The impact of mood states on decision-making behavior has revealed two styles 
of decision making: heuristic and analytic (Fiedler, 1991). When the limited research on 
anxious moods and decision-making style is considered, conflicting results are found 
with support for both analytic (Raghunathan and Pham, 1999) and heuristic (Berns, et al., 
2006) decision making existing in the literature. The current study attempts to better 
describe how anxious mood influences decision-making style by applying a dual-anxiety 
framework (Heller & Nitschke, 1997) and to broaden the scope of how mood and 
decision making is examined by looking at the interaction between state and trait anxiety 
with emotional and non-emotional decision contexts. Additionally, a fast/slow 
information-processing model for dual-anxiety is proposed by the author that would 
parallel the predictions for heuristic and analytic decision-making styles for the two 
different anxiety types. Results support trait anxious apprehension being associated with 
analytic decision-making and state anxious arousal being associated with heuristic 
decision making, however, the fast/slow model may provide a more accurate dichotomy 
for describing the impact of dual anxiety on cognition.  Additionally, the impact of 
anxiety type on decision-making style is found to be strongest in non-emotional decision 
contexts. The implications of these findings have direct applications for experimental 
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 Despite the fact that decisions are never made in an affect-free environment, the 
majority of research on decision-making strategies is built around non-emotional tasks 
(i.e. Isen & Means, 1983; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Work that has been done to 
consider affective components of decision making has either focused on the affective 
content of the decision stimuli (i.e. Fischhoff, Gonzalez, Lerner, & Small, 2005; Lerner, 
Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003) or has induced a state mood in the decision actor 
that is unrelated to the decision task (for a review see Isen, 2008). Nearly no work has 
been done that considers trait individual differences in mood and the processing of 
emotional stimuli that are relevant to the decision task. While the state effects of positive, 
sad and angry moods on decision-making behaviors have been fairly well vetted; little 
research has been done regarding the effect of either state or trait anxiety on decision-
making behavior. Further, what research has been done on anxiety and decision making 
has shown inconsistent results. The current study seeks to investigate the main effects of 
trait and state anxiety as well as how they interact with non-affective and affective 
decision contexts to influence decision-making styles.  Such research contributes to the 
development of more descriptive models of human decision-making behavior that can 
account for both individual differences in processing information and situational 
differences in the context of information. 
Mood and Decision-Making Style 
Cognitive science has greatly contributed to moving the study of decision making 
away from normative models to descriptive models (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) 
that consider the idiosyncrasies of human judgment and likelihood estimations. One vein 
of these efforts has been in the study of mood and decision making, where specific 
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decision styles have been associated with each of the major mood states (e.g. Davis, 
2009; Leith & Baumeister, 1996; Schwarz & Bless, 1991). Summarizing the literature, 
two over-arching decision styles can be observed: heuristic and analytic (also referred to 
as automatic and controlled in some contexts, for a review see Sanfey & Chang, 2008). 
These two styles make up what is commonly referred to as the dual-processing model of 
cognition (Fiedler, 1991). Heuristic decision styles are characterized as open, creative, 
spontaneous and quick with the avoidance of demanding, systematic processing of 
information (see Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Petty & Caccioppo, 
1986 for reviews). Analytic decision styles are characterized as closed, thorough, detailed 
and careful with specific and deliberative information processing (De Vries, Holland, & 
Witteman, 2008; Russ, 1993; Schwarz & Bless, 1991). Further, the motivation for 
adopting one decision-making style over another has been proposed to be either mood 
maintenance and enhancement (Isen, 1984; 1987; Isen & Geva, 1987; Isen, Nygren, & 
Ashby, 1988) or mood repair (Isen & Geva, 1987; Isen, et al., 1988; Roghunathan & 
Corfman, 2004). Thus mood directly dictates decision-making behavior in that whichever 
style is most adaptive for either maintaining a positive mood or improving a negative 
mood is the most likely style to be adopted. 
Typically, research on mood and decision making has dichotomized mood states 
as being either positive or negative. In these investigations, positive moods have been 
consistently linked to heuristic decision-making styles (see Davis, 2009 for a review). 
The adoption of this decision style is predicted to maintain or enhance the positive mood 
state, as the avoidance of effortful processing also avoids a decline in overall mood (e.g., 
Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999). Individuals in a positive mood have been found to make 
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more intrusion errors for items that fit a schema (Bless, et al., 1996), give small losses 
more weight (Isen, et al., 1988), be equally persuaded by strong and weak arguments 
(Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Stack, 1990; Bless, Mackie, & Schwarz, 1992; Bless & 
Schwarz, 1999; Forgas, 1994), make complex decisions more quickly and with less 
consideration of information (Isen & Means, 1983; Isen, Rosenzweig, & Young, 1991), 
and show more creativity during a decision (Green & Noice, 1988; Hirt, et al., 1996; Isen, 
1984; Isen & Daubman, 1984; Isen, Johnson, Mertz, & Robinson, 1985; see Isen, 2008 
for a review) than individuals in neutral or negative moods. All of these characteristics 
are demonstrative of a heuristic decision-making style. As positive moods have so 
consistently been found to correspond with heuristic decision-making styles, it was at 
first thought that negative moods would always result in analytic decision-making styles, 
making a clean dichotomy.  However as each negative mood state has been studied 
individually this has not been the case (i.e. Leith & Baumeister, 1996). Therefore, when 
considering the impact of negative mood on decision-making, one must divide negative 
mood into its subtypes: sad/dysphoric, angry, and anxious/fearful to fully account for all 
the findings. 
Following induction of a sad mood, individuals have been found to display the 
previously predicted analytic decision-making style (De Vries, Holland, & Witteman, 
2008; Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & Van Baaren, 2006; Schwarz & Bless, 1991; Shiv, 
et al., 2005). Additionally, the proposed motivation for adopting this style while in a sad 
mood is in order to repair one’s current mood state, as it is more beneficial to put effort 
into making a good decision when in a sad mood as the outcome of a good decision may 
improve one’s emotional state (Isen & Geva, 1987; Isen, et al., 1988; Roghunathan & 
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Corfman, 2004). These individuals have been found to make slower decisions and 
consider more information during the decision (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis, et al., 
2006; Wilson, 2002), be less persuaded by weak arguments (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & 
Strack, 1990), and prefer high-risk/high-reward decisions to low-risk/low-reward ones, as 
the mood increase from the high reward associated with a high risk outweighs the 
possible mood decrease associated with a high loss (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). All of 
these characteristics are demonstrative of analytical decision-making styles. 
When the decision-making style of individuals in angry moods is examined, an 
entirely different style is observed. Individuals in angry moods have been found to adopt 
a heuristic decision-making style similar to that adopted by individuals in positive moods 
but with more willingness to take risk (Leith & Baumeister, 1996; Lerner & Tiedens, 
2006). Again, the motivation behind adopting a heuristic decision style when in an angry 
mood is thought to be mood repair, as immediate action typically relieves anger 
(Bushman, Baumeister, & Phillips, 2001). Individuals in an angry mood have been found 
to select any option that contains a maximum gain, no matter how unlikely (Leith & 
Baumeister, 1996), be more persuaded by angry than sad arguments and thus rely on 
schema-congruent information (DeSteno, Petty, Rucker, Wegener, & Braverman, 2004), 
and make more intrusion errors for information that fits an angry schema (Tiedens, 
2001). 
While sad moods have been consistently associated with analytic decision-making 
styles and angry moods have been consistently associated with heuristic decision-making 
styles, the decision-making style associated with anxious moods has not been consistent, 
partially due to the limited research on the topic. Generally, individuals in anxious moods 
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have been found to adopt an analytic decision-making style (Fischhoff, Gonzalez, Lerner, 
& Small, 2005; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003; Mittal & Ross, 1998; 
Raghunathan & Corfman, 2004; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999; Tiedens & Linton, 2001; 
Wray & Stone, 2005). Some of the most thorough work on studying anxious mood 
effects on decision making is in a set of studies by Raghunathan and Pham (1999) where 
individuals in anxious moods were found to prefer low-risk/low-reward options to high-
risk/high-reward ones. When given the two options of a 6/10 chance of winning $5 
versus a 3/10 chance of winning $10, anxious individuals selected the more likely/lower 
reward option of a 6/10 chance of $5. This decision-making style generalized to job 
preferences, as these same individuals are found to prefer low-pay/high-security jobs to 
high-pay/low-security jobs as well. Note that this analytic decision-making style, while 
still slower and more thorough as in sad moods, results in a different risk preference than 
sad moods. Going back to the definition of analytical decision making used above: 
analytic decision styles are characterized as closed, thorough, detailed and careful with 
specific and deliberative information processing (De Vries, Holland, & Witteman, 2008; 
Russ, 1993; Schwarz & Bless, 1991), these results mostly focus on the characteristic of 
being careful when using an analytic decision-making style.  
This less risky decision style is thought to be driven by the motivation to reduce 
uncertainty in the anxious individuals, as evidenced by it only being consistent when 
anxious individuals are making decisions for themselves and not for others (Wray & 
Stone, 2005). The reduction of uncertainty in an anxious individual would subsequently 
serve to repair mood, as uncertainty is believed to be the most common source of anxiety 
(Mittal & Ross, 1998; Raghunathan & Corfman, 2004; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999; 
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Tiedens & Linton, 2001; Wray & Stone, 2005). Nonetheless, when the actual context of 
the decision to be made induces anxiety, different decision styles have been found in high 
anxiety individuals from that reported above.  
In a study investigating the neurological basis of dread, participants were given 
the choice between immediate and delayed cutaneous shocks (Berns, et al., 2006). It was 
found that “high dreaders” (likened to fearful or anxious individuals) would choose to 
receive a more severe shock immediately than wait for a lesser shock. Further, these 
individuals were identifiable via the increased rate of activity in areas of the cortical pain 
matrix even when no decision was required (i.e., forced to wait for a shock rather than 
given a choice), which suggests that their hasty decision-making style may stem from a 
trait difference in reacting to threats. These individuals appear to be using their affective 
somatic responses to inform their decision-making, resulting in quick, suboptimal 
decisions rather than low risk ones. The hypothesis that these individuals seek to reduce 
uncertainty can still account for these results; however, as choosing a larger negative 
outcome that happens immediately has no uncertainty component. Going back to the 
definition of heuristic decision making used above: heuristic decision styles are 
characterized as open, creative, spontaneous and quick with the avoidance of demanding, 
systematic processing of information (see Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Eagly & Chaiken, 
1993; Petty & Caccioppo, 1986 for reviews), choosing immediate, higher risk options 
over delayed, lower risk options may describe being spontaneous, but risky decision 
making does not necessarily denote being heuristic. Thus, while individuals high in 
anxiety have been found to be careful or risky depending upon the decision context, 
direct support for one being analytic and the other being heuristic is not provided. 
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Thus, in the examination of the influence of anxiety on decision making, 
individuals experiencing high anxiety have been found to perform analytically, or 
carefully, in neutral, non-threatening decision scenarios (Raghunathan and Pham, 1999) 
and heuristically, or hastily, in threatening decision scenarios (Berns, et al., 2006). 
Whether or not this is evidence of high anxiety leading to the adoption of two different 
decision-making strategies still needs to be determined. The question of what causes an 
anxious individual to adopt one decision style over the other remains unexplored. There 
is some neural evidence to suggest that these two different decision styles may be the 
result of trait differences in the individuals, which would imply two different types of 
trait anxiety; however, the possibility of a single trait anxiety that responds differently to 
the state context of a scenario also exists.  
The Dual-Anxiety Model: Anxious Apprehension and Anxious Arousal 
A dual model of anxiety may be able to account for both heuristic and analytic 
decision making styles when an individual is experiencing an anxious mood. It has been 
proposed by a number of researchers that there are actually two types or aspects of 
anxiety with distinct properties: apprehension, anticipatory frustration, and worry versus 
fear and stress (Barlow, 1988; 1996; Dien, 1999; Gray & McNaughton, 2000; Heller, 
Nitschke, Etienne, & Miller, 1997, O’Hare & Dien, 2008). The dual-anxiety model 
developed by Heller and colleagues (1997) articulates these different types of anxiety as 
anxious apprehension and anxious arousal, with anxious apprehension being typified by 
worry and verbal rumination (Barlow, 1991) about perceived threats in the immediate or 
distant future (Engels, et al., 2007), and anxious arousal being typified by somatic tension 
and physiological hyper-arousal due to perceived threats in the immediate future 
8 
 
(Nitschke, Heller, Palmieri, & Miller, 1999). These two types of anxiety may be able to 
simultaneously account for the different effects of anxiety on decision-making style 
previously discussed. 
According to this model, these aspects of anxiety occur to varying degrees in an 
individual and often co-occur, as anxious arousal has been induced in individuals high in 
anxious apprehension via emotional narratives (Heller, et al, 1997), but also has been 
measured as a separate trait construct with separate neural correlates and behavioral 
outcomes (Dien, 1999; Engels, et al., 2007; O’Hare & Dien, 2008). Thus, differences in 
anxiety type have been measured via state manipulations, as well as trait measures. 
Behaviorally, individuals high in anxious apprehension have been shown to have slower 
responses during stimulus discrimination and widened attentional scopes (Dien, 1999), 
this may be due to an inefficient attentional disengagement system (Posner & Petersen, 
1990) that struggles with disambiguating potential threats from benign stimuli (Fox, et 
al., 2001; 2002). On-the-other-hand, individuals high in anxious arousal have been found 
to be faster at discriminating between stimuli and have narrowed attentional focus (Dien, 
1999), this may be due to anxious arousal resulting in hyper-activation of the fight-or-
flight system (Cannon, 1927), which has been associated with rapid detection and action 
in the face of a threat (Hansen & Hansen , 1988; Ohman, Dimberg, & Ost, 1985; Ohman, 
Flykt, & Esteves, 2001). 
Additionally, differential hemispheric lateralization for anxious apprehension and 
anxious arousal using resting electroencephalography (EEG) asymmetry (Heller, et al., 
1997) has been established. It was found that high anxious apprehension individuals have 
more brain activity over the left frontal lobe than the right; however, when a state of 
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anxious arousal is induced via emotional narratives, more activity is recorded over the 
right posterior cortex than the left. Left frontal and right posterior activity for anxious 
apprehension and anxious arousal, respectively, has been supported by research using 
event-related potentials (ERPs; Dien, 1999; O’Hare & Dien, 2008) and changes in the 
blood-oxygen level dependent (BOLD) response using functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI; Engels, et al., 2007).  
Thus, when taking the neuroscience evidence into consideration, these two 
different types of anxiety and their respective brain activation patterns could account for 
the two different decision styles seen in mood and decision-making research. Areas of the 
left prefrontal cortex (PFC) have been found to be involved in controlled response 
selection (Eshel, Nelson, Blair, Pine & Ernst, 2007; Ernst & Paulus, 2005; Goghari & 
MacDonald, 2009). The heightened left PFC activity observed in high anxious 
apprehension individuals may reflect additional resources being allocated to choice 
selection during a decision task, and this activity may reflect the thoughtful, analytic 
decision style commonly reported for individuals high in anxiety.  
Further, areas of the posterior occipito-parietal cortex have been implicated in 
early, automatic selection processes (Bradley, et al., 2003; Eshel, et al., 2007; Schupp, et 
al., 2004) with the right hemisphere having more involvement in attentional selection of 
salient information (Mevora, Humphreys & Shalev, 2009) than the left. The heightened 
right posterior activity observed in high anxious arousal individuals may reflect speeded 
attentional selection for salient information, such as threatening choice options, and this 
activity may reflect the hurried, heuristic decision style reported for high anxiety 
individuals when dealing with a choice that involves a direct threat.  
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It is important to note that while Heller and colleagues, among other dual-anxiety 
theorists, dichotomize anxious apprehension and anxious arousal as two trait anxieties, 
others categorize anxious arousal as only a state anxiety, as the cognitive effects of 
anxious arousal are typically only observed when a threatening context is present (Endler 
& Kocoski, 2001). Indeed even in the neuroimaging data described above, different 
activation patterns in the posterior parietal cortex for individuals high in anxious arousal 
scores were only present in the context of negative words in an emotional Stroop task 
(Engels, et al., 2007). Nonetheless, even when a threatening context is needed to induce 
information-processing patterns associated with anxious arousal, the cognitive effects of 
such patterns have been found to generalize to non-threatening, neutral contexts.  
In a recent study (Pacheco-Unguetti, et al., 2010), individuals high in trait anxiety, 
as indexed by the trait subscale of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; 
Spielberger, 1983), were found to have decreased executive attentional control during a 
neutral Attention Network Task (ANT, Callejas, et al., 2004), while individuals low in 
trait anxiety but high in state anxiety, as indexed by the state subscale of the STAI, 
following exposure to negative images and text were found to have increased attentional 
alerting and orienting during the same task. These findings, that trait and state anxiety can 
differentially impact various stages of attention, led to the conclusion that trait anxiety is 
likely manifested by a top-down network in which malfunctions in executive control lead 
to strategies and attitudes that make it difficult to inhibit distracting information in the 
absence of situational triggers (which can lead to worry), while state anxiety is likely a 
result of a bottom-up network in which early attentional sensitivities make one more 
vigilant and responsive to information in general, especially if it is negatively valenced. 
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The insinuation that trait anxiety can interfere with executive control has been supported 
by fMRI data in which individuals high in trait anxiety had decreased prefrontal 
recruitment during a non-emotional Flanker task that corresponded with their decreased 
ability to inhibit non-emotional distracters (Bishop, 2009).  
If the behavioral and cognitive effects of anxious arousal can only be observed 
following a negative mood induction, even if the task itself is non-emotional, then the 
debate over whether or not the dual-anxiety model dichotomizes anxiety as trait/trait or 
trait/state between anxious apprehension and anxious arousal is somewhat of a moot 
point, as both would dictate that without some sort of situational trigger, the information-
processing patterns associated with anxious arousal will not be activated. This debate 
between a trait/trait or trait/state dichotomy reflects a much broader debate that has 
transpired in personality research. As such, trait theorists studying individual differences 
have argued for trait moods dictating personality (see Eysenck, 1991 for a review), and 
others have argued that traits are not consistent across situations thus environmental 
context must be considered in personality as well (see Delphine, et al., 2008 for a 
review). Most agree now that personality is a result of both person and situation 
variables, which is termed the interaction model of personality (Dreger, 1985; Endler, 
1983, 1997; Spielberger, 1985). Indeed, this seems to be the most parsimonious approach 
for applying dual-anxiety models to the existing data on the effects of anxiety type on 
cognition. 
The two functional systems proposed for anxious apprehension, disambiguating 
threats and non-threats, and anxious arousal, quickly identifying and responding to 
threats, also reflect two distinct scenarios that have been identified in the decision-
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making literature, uncertainty and risk (e.g., Edwards, 1954; Ranyard, Crozier, & 
Svenson, 1997). According to decision-making theory, when the likelihood of an 
outcome is unknown and the decision-actor is ill-informed one is making a decision 
under a situation of uncertainty (Mukherjee, 2010). This situation is distinct from when 
one is making a decision with known possible undesirable outcomes, which denotes a 
situation of risk (Teigen & Brun, 1997).  For the current study, a link between making 
decisions under conditions of uncertainty and increases in anxious apprehension and its 
hypothesized analytical decision-making style is being drawn, as uncertainty does not 
necessarily include a situational trigger for threat. Additionally, a link between making 
decisions under conditions of risk and increases in anxious arousal and its hypothesized 
heuristic decision-making style is also being drawn, as knowledge of a risk should 
activate attentional systems for threat. To date, despite the insinuations that trait 
anxiety/anxious apprehension impacts executive/top-down processes, research on the 
cognitive implications of such systems have not gone beyond basic cognitive paradigms, 
such as the emotional Stroop, ANT, and flanker tasks, which access very early, rapid 
cognitions. Thus, the application of the dual-anxiety model to even higher level 
cognitions, such as multiple-step decision making is an important expansion in the 
literature. 
The cognitive research that has been conducted on the dual-anxiety model does 
draw important parallels to two other characteristics of analytic and heuristic decision-
making styles: slow versus fast processing. While these attentional paradigms do not 
entail multi-step, complex decision processes that are typically of interest in the field of 
decision science, they do still involve more basic forms of decision making, such as 
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stimulus discrimination and response selection. These earlier, simpler decisions perhaps 
provide better insight into how anxious apprehension and anxious arousal are related to 
the dual-process cognitions.  
Previous work by the author has shown that individuals high in anxious arousal 
show a global attentional sensitivity to stimuli in their environment, as indexed by an 
event-related potential (ERP) belonging to the attentional P300 complex, while 
individuals high in anxious apprehension do not (O’Hare & Dien, 2008). This effect has 
also been found to be specific for negatively valenced words in an emotional version of 
the Stroop task (O’Hare, Dien, Gillath, Canterberry, & Stetler, 2010). Thus, at the very 
first stage of attentional selection, individuals high in anxious arousal seem primed to 
quickly detect stimuli. On the other hand, other research has shown that individuals high 
in anxious apprehension show no advantages for early detection of stimuli, but rather, 
show difficulty disengaging attention from anxiety-relevant stimuli, such as angry faces, 
once they have been detected (Fox, et al., 2001; 2002). Thus, again at the earliest stages 
of attentional processing, individuals high in anxious apprehension seem to have slowed 
processing of information via difficulty disengaging and shifting attention away from 
negative information. 
Further down the cognitive stream, individuals high in anxious arousal and 
anxious apprehension have also been found to differ in cognitive control (O’Hare, 
Gillath, Dien, Canterberry, & Stetler, 2009; O’Hare, Gillath, Dien, Canterberry, Lang & 
Stetler, 2009). In an emotional version of the Flanker task, in which emotionally valenced 
primes were presented prior to the Flanker stimulus, individuals were found to have 
decreased interference effects from the incongruent flanker trials following neutral 
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primes the higher they scored in anxious apprehension but lose this advantage following 
negative primes, while individuals were found to have decreased interference from 
incongruent flanker trials following negative primes the higher they scored in anxious 
arousal but show no advantage following neutral primes. This findings were consistent 
across both behavioral (O’Hare, et al., 2009a) and neurological (O’Hare, et al., 2009b) 
measures. Thus, as an individual increases in anxious arousal, their speed of processing 
increases following negative information, allowing them to better inhibit distracting 
information and make correct response selections. On the other hand, the higher and 
individual scores in anxious apprehension the better their cognitive control in neutral 
settings, but the slower their information processing following negative information, 
resulting in difficulty inhibiting distracting information and consequently, slower 
response time.  
Summarizing the previous work on the attentional implications of anxious arousal 
versus anxious apprehension by the author, these two types of anxiety appear to start 
diverging into heuristic versus analytic information processing, respectively, very early in 
the information-processing stream via differences in information-processing speed. 
Across multiple paradigms it has been found that as an individual increases in anxious 
arousal their information-processing speed experiences increased facilitation by the 
presence of a negative stimulus, however, as an individual increases in anxious 
apprehension their information-processing speed experiences increased hinderance by the 
presence of a negative stimulus. Thus, it seems plausible that this dissociation in 
information-processing styles would continue to matriculate up to how information is 
processed during a complex, multi-step decision. A formulation for the author’s proposed 
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model of dual-anxiety processing in the brain across multiple domains of cognition is 







Figure 1. A possible model for the cascade of a) fast information processing that is seen 
in anxious arousal and b) slow information processing that is seen in anxious 
apprehension across multiple domains of cognition. 
 
Multiple Attribute Decision Making (MADM) and Process Theory 
The decision-making paradigm for the current study comes from MADM 
research. MADM paradigms are designed to examine decision-making behavior when the 
choices to be made have multiple attributes to be considered (Xu, 2007) and are typically 
analyzed using process theory techniques (Payne, 1976; Svenson, 1979). Process theory 
emphasizes information search and combinations during decision processing rather than 
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before (input) and after (output) variables, thus providing insight into the different 
decision strategies that can lead to the same choice outcome.  
One technique for studying decision-making processes within the framework of 
process theory utilizes information boards. In such studies, participants have to actively 
seek out the attribute information to make the decision by flipping over cards or pressing 
buttons on a computerized version of the task (Payne, 1976), which is how the decision-
making paradigm is modeled for the current study. In this way, the order in which and 
how much information is considered can be tracked. Nonetheless, different decision 
strategies may lead to the same search patterns, so different search patterns can be 
interpreted as reflecting different strategies, but a specific search pattern does not 
necessarily reflect a single decision strategy. 
In application to the study of mood and decision making, the MADM approach 
has successfully been used before to discriminate between decision-making styles when 
in a positive versus neutral mood (Isen & Means, 1983). In a study demonstrating the 
quick decisions made in a positive mood, subjects were given the choice between six 
cars, each with nine dimensions on which they were ranked. Subjects were asked to think 
aloud as they considered the information in selecting the best car. Post-decision, subjects 
gave their own ratings for the importance of each of the nine dimensions to provide each 
individual’s subjective utility that could be compared to their ultimate decision behavior. 
Individuals in a positive mood were not found to differ in the ultimate decision outcomes 
from individuals in a neutral mood; however, they were found to come to the decision 
outcome more quickly, with less likelihood of reviewing information at which they had 
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already looked, and with more likelihood of ignoring information considered 
unimportant. 
The time it takes to complete a decision when using process tracing techniques 
can put the applicability of the decision findings into question. In studies utilizing process 
theory techniques participants are typically presented with only one or two decision 
situations, thus there is a need for repeated measures research on this topic. Additionally, 
the length of the trials in these studies often leads to between-subjects designs. A 
repeated measures design in which participants served as their own controls would be 
highly informative because it would control for individual differences; however, this is 
not without the increased possibility of the decisions becoming routine and causing order 
effects in the decision behavior. Additionally, having the state moods induced come from 
the actual context of the decision to be made would increase the ecological validity of 
any findings, thus the current study utilizes decision scenarios which are neutral, 
uncertain, and threatening in context to induce mood, rather than unrelated emotional 
stimuli. 
Summary 
 There is compelling evidence to support the influence of mood on decision-
making style (Anderson, 1974, 1981; Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1991; Fiedler, 1991; 
Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001). One area that still needs clarification is regarding the 
influence of anxious moods on decision-making style, as current research has reported 
two different decision styles associated with anxiety (Berns, et al., 2006; Raghunathan 
and Pham, 1999). If these differences in decision-making style in individuals high in 
anxiety are due to situational or intrapersonal factors or the interaction between the two is 
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unknown. MADM paradigms and process theory techniques can be utilized to better 
discern the nature of how anxiety and decision contexts influence decision-making style. 
Further, measuring the different types of anxieties as continues, individual difference 
variables rather than as categorical grouping variables will allow for a more descriptive 
exploration of the nature of the effects of anxiety on information processing and decision-
making style. 
Theoretical and Empirical Predictions 
Main Effects for trait anxiety 
 If decision style is influenced strictly by trait mood effects, then there are 
predictable patterns of behavior for individuals high in anxious apprehension versus 
individuals high in anxious arousal. Individuals high in anxious apprehension have been 
proposed to adopt an analytic decision-making style. This style would result in longer 
times to make decisions and more information considered per decision in general, as well 
as more consideration of information rated as unimportant. Specifically, the more 
uncertain an anxious apprehension individual is the slower and more analytic they should 
become in the different decision scenarios. Individuals high in anxious arousal have been 
proposed to adopt a hasty, heuristic decision-making style. This style would result in 
shorter times to make decisions and less information considered per decision in general. 
Specifically, the more threatened an anxious arousal individual is the faster and more 
heuristic they should become in the decision scenarios. 
Main effects for context-dependent mood 
 If decision style is influenced strictly by state mood effects, then there are 
predictable patterns of behavior for the three decision scenarios. Uncertain decision 
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scenarios should induce an increase in state anxious apprehension in all participants, 
which again, is characterized by symptoms of worry and rumination. This should result in 
a temporary analytic decision-making style regardless of trait anxiety scores. Threatening 
decision scenarios should induce an increase in state anxious arousal, which is 
characterized by the somatic symptoms of anxiety. This should result in a temporary 
heuristic decision-making style regardless of trait anxiety scores. 
Interaction between trait and state mood 
 Finally, it is possible that the decision-making styles proposed to be associated 
with anxious apprehension and anxious arousal will only become dominant when it is 
primed by the context of the immediate decision to be made. In this manner, individuals 
high in anxious apprehension would show an increase in analytical decision-making style 
following an uncertain or threatening decision scenario. Correspondingly, individuals 
high in anxious arousal would show an increase in heuristic decision-making style 
following a threatening decision scenario. As the state context of the decision scenarios 
interacting with the trait individual differences of anxiety type is most congruent with the 
interaction model of personality (Endler & Kocoski, 2001), this is predicted to be the 
most likely outcome. As states of anxious arousal have been induced in trait anxious 
apprehension individuals before (Heller, et al., 1997), it is also possible that anxious 
apprehension individuals will adopt an analytic decision-making style during the 
uncertain decision scenario and will switch to a heuristic decision-making style during 
the threatening decision scenario after having experienced an increase in state anxious 






 Ninety-three [62 females, Mage = 18.89 (SD = .97)] undergraduate participants 
from the University of Kansas participant pool received course credit for their 
participation. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were native 
English speakers, and gave written consent prior to any experimental proceedings. 
Materials 
 Experimental Stimuli 
 Three different types (TYPE) of decision scenarios were created (classroom 
performance, president of student government, and romantic relationship), each with 
three different contexts (CONTEXT: neutral, uncertain, and threatening; see Appendix 
A). The decision scenarios each described a different situation with which undergraduate 
students should have familiarity. The manipulation of mood by the decision scenarios 
was tested via a pilot study in which 14 participants from a convenience sample rated 
their current mood following reading each of the nine possible scenario variations. Pilot 
participants rated how much each of a series of adjectives from the Positive Affect 
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS-X) negative, positive and fear subscales (Watson & 
Clark, 1991) and the Beck Anxiety Inventory (Beck & Steer, 1990) described their 
current mood on a 5-point Likert scale. The adjectives chosen depicted four mood 
categories: positive, general negative, uncertainty, and fear (see Appendix B). There was 
a significant TYPE by CONTEXT interaction on mood ratings, F(4, 52) = 5.12, p = .002, 
such that the “President of student government” scenario had significantly higher ratings 
for positive mood (M = 2.56, SD = .16) than the “Classroom performance” (M = 2.05, 
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SD = .16) and the “Romantic relationship” (M = 1.94, SD = .14) scenario types. 
Nonetheless, scenarios with a threatening context (M = 2.81, SD = .17) were found to 
have significantly higher ratings of fearful mood than uncertainty (M = 2.46, SD = .21) or 
neutral (M = 1.49, SD = .10) contexts; scenarios with a threatening (M = 3.22, SD = .14) 
or an uncertainty (M = 3.02, SD = .18) context were found to have significantly higher 
ratings of uncertain mood than neutral contexts (M = 1.80, SD = .14); and scenarios with 
a neutral context (M = 2.71, SD = .20) were found to have significantly higher ratings of 
positive mood than threatening (M = 1.91, SD = .11) or uncertainty (M = 1.93, SD = .16) 
contexts. 
 Eight, two-choice decisions were created for each decision scenario. Each choice 
option was accompanied by four attributes that could be examined for further information 
regarding each choice. These four attributes provided additional information related to 
each choice it terms of social effects, personal success effects, personal happiness effects, 
and academic effects. The two-choice pairings included options that were social, 
information-gathering, threat-avoidant, or unrelated actions (see Appendix A). Two of 
each option type was paired together for each decision (e.g. social/social, threat-
avoidant/threat-avoidant, etc.), to encourage attribute consideration. Each option type 
pairing occurred twice per decision.  
 Psychometrics 
To obtain a measurement of anxious apprehension, participants completed a 
computerized version of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-S and 
STAI-T, respectively; see Appendix C; Spielberger, 1983). The STAI-T is commonly 
used as an experimental measure of trait anxiety as it measures a number of cognitive, 
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behavioral, and affective symptoms of anxiety. The STAI-T directly addresses aspects of 
worry, which is thought to best characterize anxious apprehension. The STAI-S is a 
common measure of state anxiety. This subscale of the STAI measures similar constructs 
as the STAI-T; however, asks the rater to respond how much the symptoms represent 
their current, immediate feelings rather than how they feel in general. As it has been used 
by others (Pacheco-Unguetti, et al., 2010) the STAI-S will be used as a state measure of 
anxious arousal here. To obtain a measurement of trait anxious arousal, participants 
completed a computerized version of the Fear Survey Schedule (FSS) (Braun & 
Reynolds, 1969; see Appendix C). The FSS is commonly used to measure trait 
fearfulness. The version used for this study (Temple Fear Survey Inventory, TFSI) 
assesses fear of 100 common phobic stimuli. Feelings of fear are thought to be similar, if 
not equivalent to anxious arousal.  
Apparatus 
All experiment materials were presented via E-prime version 1.1 experiment 
presentation scripts (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002) and presented on a Dell 
Dimension 8300 PC. 
Experimental Design and Procedure 
 Upon entering the lab, each participant gave written consent and provided basic 
demographic information before beginning the experimental procedure. Each participant 
experienced each of the three decision scenario types (classroom performance, president 
of student government, and romantic relationship), one of each context type (neutral, 
uncertain or threatening). Order of decision scenario type and valence was fully 
counterbalanced across participants (36 different possible orders in all). Participants were 
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presented with instructions asking them to imagine themselves in the position the given 
decision scenario posits (see Appendix D). Following the decision scenario, participants 
were presented with a series of two-choice decisions regarding the scenario. Participants 
were instructed to select a choice after they had considered enough information to do so 
(see Appendix E). Presentation order of two-choice pairings was randomized. Following 
all two-choice decisions for a scenario participants reported their current mood in the 
same manner as was done in the pilot study. Following completion of the manipulation 
check, participants again were instructed to place themselves in the position of that 
posited by the second decision scenario, again followed by eight two-choice decisions 
and a manipulation check. The same procedure continued for the third decision scenario.  
 Selections were made during the two-choice decisions via a button press on the 
mouse. The four attributes that accompanied each choice option could be viewed via a 
button press on the mouse. Selecting to view an attribute took the participant to a 
different screen where only the information for that attribute for that choice option was 
displayed. Upon reading the attribute information, participants were directed back to the 
main two-choice selection page. In this manner, order and amount of attribute 
information considered during each two-choice decision was recorded. A screenshot of 




Figure 2. Participants could select option A or option B for each two-choice decision by 
clicking in either of their rectangles. The actual text of the choices (e.g. “Send your 
significant other an email asking them to tell you what’s on their mind”) was displayed 
where “[OptionA]” and “[OptionB]” are displayed here. Participants could seek out 
additional information about each choice by clicking in the rectangles for  any of the 
attributes.  
 
 Upon completion of all three decision scenarios participants ranked the four 
different attribute types for each choice option on how important they were for making 
their decisions on a 5-point Likert scale. Order of attribute type presentation for ranking 
was randomized. Finally, participants completed computerized versions of the STAI and 
FSS. Presentation of anxiety survey was counterbalanced across subjects. After 
completing the anxiety surveys, participants were given a written debriefing statement 
and had the opportunity to ask any questions before leaving the lab.  
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Decision Style Measurement 
 Heuristic decision-making style was characterized by less time to make a decision 
during the two-choice decisions, less consideration of information prior to making 
decisions, and less likelihood to consider information that has been rated as unimportant 
prior to making decisions. Analytic decision-making style was characterized by more 
time to make a decision during the two-choice decisions, more consideration of 
information prior to making decisions, and higher likelihood to consider information that 
has been rated as unimportant prior to making decisions. 
Time to make decisions 
 Time to make a decision was measured as the difference in seconds between the 
onset of a two-choice decision and the offset of selecting one of the two choices. This 
variable was dependent upon how many choice attributes were examined during each 
decision period and the amount of time that was spent considering each choice.  
Amount of information considered per decision 
 Total amount of information considered per decision was measured as the number 
of attributes that was looked at during each two-choice decision. Each time an attribute 
was looked at before making the final decision was counted as an additional piece of 
information considered.  
Likelihood to consider information rated as important 
 Following completion of all decision scenarios and choices, participants were 
giving the instructions to rate “how important was this type of information to your 
choices” on a 5-point Likert scale for each of the attribute types. The ratings of how 
important each attribute type was to making a decision were used to determine if 
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participants were more likely to consider attributes rated as important. Likelihood is 
measured as the number of times looking at each type of attribute.  
Results 
Psychometrics 
 To check for shared covariance (colinearity) among the state (M = 38.97, SD = 
10.62) and trait (M = 40.92, SD = 9.24) subscales of the STAI and the FSS (M = 279.15, 
SD = 69.62), Pearson’s correlations were conducted between each. The state and trait 
subscales of the STAI were found to have a strong positive correlation, r = .51, p < .01, as 
were the trait subscale of the STAI and the FSS, r = .44, p < .01. The state subscale of the 
STAI and the FSS were not found to share a significant relationship, r = .17, p =.12. The 
significant correlations between the state and trait subscales of the STAI and the trait 
subscale of the STAI and the FSS indicate that there is shared covariance between these 
anxiety surveys. To keep this colinearity from inflating any effects in the analyses, 
hierarchical regressions will be used. 
Mood Manipulation Check 
 The mood ratings were not found to significantly differ between the decision 
scenario types nor the decision scenario contexts, despite the scenarios showing different 
elicitations of uncertain and fearful moods in the pilot study. Compared to baseline mood 
ratings, all scenario types were found to only have significantly lower ratings of positive 
mood, t(92) = 6.56, p < .001 (neutral scenarios), t(92) = 7.70, p < . 001 (uncertain 
scenarios), and t(92) = 7.51, p < .001, following a Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons. No differences in general negative, uncertainty or fearful mood were found. 
Since the mood manipulation data cannot be used to distinguish between the different 
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scenarios, they will not be considered further in this analysis. Means and standard 
deviations for the different mood manipulation checks can be found in Table 1.  
Table 1.  
Means and standard deviations for mood ratings following each decision scenario. 
 Positive General Negative Uncertainty Fearful 
Baseline 3.17 (.77) 1.33 (.50) 1.67 (.61) 1.42 (.55) 
Neutral Scenarios 2.68 (.99) 1.29 (.51) 1.50 (.60) 1.32 (.52) 
Uncertain Scenarios 2.63 (.83) 1.31 (.48) 1.59 (.68) 1.36 (.54) 
Threatening Scenarios 2.69 (.97) 1.30 (.51) 1.61 (.69) 1.34 (.53) 
 
 As it is possible that completing three decision scenarios in a row may have 
washed out the effects of the mood manipulations over time, the mood ratings for the first 
decision scenario were examined independently. Mood ratings for the first decision 
scenario were not found to significantly differ for the different decision scenario types. 
For each mood rating category (positive, general negative, uncertainty, and fearful) a 3 
(decision scenario context) way within groups ANOVA was run. Ratings of positive, F(2, 
90) = 3.36, p = .04, and general negative, F(2, 90) = 7.15, p < .01, mood were found to 
significantly differ between the different decision scenario contexts. Bonferroni posthoc 
analyses revealed that none of these differences remain significant for positive mood 
ratings; however, for general negative mood ratings threatening decision contexts (M =  
.1.48, SD = .66) were found to have significantly higher ratings than neutral decision 
contexts (M = .98, SD = .57), as were uncertain decision contexts (M = 1.51, SD = .68). 
Nonetheless, when general negative mood ratings were used a predictor of decision 
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behavior via regression models, it was not found to significantly predict time to make a 
decision, F(2, 90) = 2.29, p = .11, nor amount of information considered prior to a 
decision, F(2, 90) = 2.13, p = .13. Thus, none of the mood ratings will be considered 
further as predictors of decision-making style. 
Time to Make a Decision 
 Order effects 
 Despite full counterbalancing, both order of scenario type and order of scenario 
context were examined via 3 (TYPE order) by 3 (CONTEXT order) by 3 (CONTEXT) 
within-group analyses of variance (ANOVAs). No significant effect of order of scenario 
type was found on time to make a decision, F(10, 116) = .85, p = .58; however scenario 
context was found to have a large effect on time to make a decision, F(10, 116) = 6.25, p 
< .01, !2 = .35. The nature of this effect is such that regardless of which context is 
presented first, the first decision scenario (M = 33, SD = 25) always has significantly 
longer times to make a decision than the second (M = 23, SD = 20) or third (M = 20, SD 
= 17) scenarios (see Figure 3). To ensure that this order effect is not driving any of the 
results, each of the chronological decision scenarios were analyzed separately and the 
results from these analyses are included in Appendix F. No main effect of scenario 






Figure 3. An order effect was found for order of decision scenario context on time to 
make a decision, such that regardless of context, the first scenario had significantly 
longer decisions than the second or third. 
 
As shown in Appendix F, the regression weights for each of the chronological decision 
scenarios for each of the anxiety predictors are similar, thus it is clear that the order of 
decision context is not driving the effects of anxiety type on time to make a decision. For 
this reason, it is valid to examine the predictive validity of the anxiety measures on the 
time to make a decision for the decision scenario contexts overall. Overall means and 
standard deviations for time to make a decision can be found in Table 2. Hierarchical 
multiple regressions were conducted using STAI-S, STAI-T, and FSS scores as 
predictors for time to make a decision for each decision context. For each analysis, STAI-
S (state anxious arousal) scores were entered in the first step, followed by STAI-T (trait 


































third (this order was chosen after each possible order was ran and all were found to yield 
the same results, which supports the following findings being true findings and not type I 
errors due to inflation from colinearity). Hierarchical regressions further help to control 
for colinearity by including all shared covariance with the first entered predictor, leaving 
subsequent predictors unique.  
Table 2. 
Means and standard deviations for time to make a decision for each of the decision 
scenario contexts. 
 
Mean Time in Seconds (SD) 
Neutral Scenarios 26 (24) 
Uncertain Scenarios 24 (19) 
Threatening Scenarios 27 (22) 
 
For neutral contexts, all three steps of the regression model were found to be 
significant: Step 1, F(1, 91) = 11.96, p < .01, R2 = .11; Step 2, F(2, 90) = 10.19, p < .01, 
R2 = .17; and Step 3, F(3, 89) = 6.87, p < .01, R2 = .16. This was driven by STAI-S scores 
predicting faster decision times and STAI-T scores predicting slower decision times, thus 
as a person scores higher in state anxious arousal, as measured by the STAI-S, they make 
faster and faster decisions, yet as a person scores higher in trait anxious apprehension, as 
measured by the STAI-T, they make slower and slower decisions. For uncertain contexts, 
none of the steps of the regression model were found to be significant: Step 1, F(1, 91) = 
1.40, p = .24, R2 = .00; Step 2, F(2, 90) = .89, p = .42, R2 = .00; and Step 3, F(3, 89) = 
.42, R2 = -.01. Lastly, for threatening contexts, all three steps of the regression model 
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were found to be significant: Step 1, F(1, 91) = 3.37, p = .07, R2 = .03; Step 2, F(2, 90) = 
4.37, p = .02, R2 =.07; and Step 3, F(3, 89) = 3.03, p = .03, R2 = .06. Again, the effects 
for this model mirror those found for the neutral context model. Trait anxious arousal 
scores, as measured by the FSS, were not found to reliably predict time to make a 
decision for any of the decision contexts, and in fact, was found to decrease the reliable 
predictability of the regression models as seen via the decreased values in adjusted R2 
statistics following its inclusion in the models (Step 3). Unstandardized and standardized 
slopes for these models can be found in Table 3.  
Table 3. 
Unstandardized slopes for the regression model predicting time to make a decision from 
anxiety type for each decision scenario contexts with standardized betas in parentheses. 
 Neutral* Uncertain Threatening* 
Intercept 41 25 24 
STAI-S -1 (-.50)** -.3 (-.15)ns -.7 (-.32)** 
STAI-T .9 (.34)** .06 (.03)ns .5 (.23)† 
FSS -.02 (-.07)ns .03 (.10)ns .02 (.07)ns 
** indicates significance at the " = .01 level 
* indicates significance at the " = .05 level 
† indicates a statistical trend (p = .08) 
 
 To ensure that the above results are valid and not being driven by possible 
confounds within the study design, scenario type and gender were checked for third-
variable influences. Overall scenario type was examined for a main effect on time to 
make a decision via a 3(TYPE) within-groups ANOVA. A significant effect of scenario 
type was found, F(2, 184) = 7.20, p < .01, !2 = .07. Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons 
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revealed that the nature of this effect is such that the PRESIDENT scenario (M = 30, SD 
= 2) is associated with significantly greater times to make a decision than the 
CLASSROOM (M = 23, SD = 2) and RELATIONSHIP (M = 24, SD = 2) scenarios, 
which do not significantly differ from each other. 
To ensure that the scenario type effect found in the original ANCOVA does not 
interfere with the anxiety type by scenario context effects reported above, hierarchical 
regressions were run for each scenario type by scenario context combination (i.e. 
classroom-neutral, classroom-uncertain, classroom-threatening, etc). Out of all nine 
models (one for each type by context combination) only the model predicting time to 
make a decision from anxiety type for the neutral president of student government 
scenario was significant. For this scenario, all three steps of the regression model were 
found to be significant, F(3, 8) = 11.67, p < .01, R2 = .74. The pattern of anxiety type 
effects were the same as was found for the overall scenario context analyses, such that 
STAI-S scores reliably predict faster times to make a decision, and STAI-T scores 
reliably predict longer times to make a decision. Unstandardized and standardized slopes 
for this model can be found in Table 4. Since the nature of the effects of anxiety type on 
time to make a decision do not differ here from what is found in the analyses for the 
different decision contexts, the effect of the president of student body scenario resulting 
in longer times to make a decision does not qualitatively change the impact of anxiety 
type on decision time within different contexts. Thus, the effect of the decision-scenario 





Table 4.  
Unstandardized slopes for the regression model predicting time to make a decision from 
anxiety type for the neutral president of student body scenario. 






** indicates significant at the " = .01 level 
* indicates significant at the " = .05 level 
 
 Effects of gender on anxiety levels or time to make a decision were examined via 
a 2 (gender) between by 3 (CONTEXT) within mixed analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) 
using STAI-S, STAI-T, and FSS scores as covariates. No significant interactions or main 
effects of gender on time to make a decision were found, thus gender was not further 
considered in the time to make a decision analyses. 
Amount of Information Considered per Decision 
 Order Effects 
 Again, both order of scenario type and order of scenario context were examined 
via 3 (TYPE order) by 3 (CONTEXT order) by 3 (CONTEXT) within-group analyses of 
variance (ANOVAs). No significant effect of decision type order was found on number 
of attributes considered, F(10, 116) = .76, p = .66; however decision context order was 
found to have a large effect on number of attributes considered, F(10, 116) = 4.05, p < 
.01, !2 = .26. Again, the nature of this effect is such that regardless of which context is 
presented first, the first decision scenario (M = 2.63, SD = 2.62) always has significantly 
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more number of attributes considered than the second (M = 1.85, SD = 2.34) or third (M 
= 1.55, SD = 2.18) scenarios (see Figure 4). To ensure that this order effect is not driving 
any of the results, each of the chronological decision scenarios were analyzed separately 
and the results of these analyses can be found in Appendix G. No main effect of context 
alone was found on amount of attributes considered prior to making a decision, F(2, 116) 
= 1.38, p = .26. 
 
Figure 4. An order effect was found for order of decision scenario context on number of 
attributes considered per decision, such that regardless of context, the first scenario had 
significantly more attributes considered than the second or third. 
 
 As is shown in Appendix G, the regression weights for each of the chronological 
decision scenarios for each of the anxiety predictors are similar, thus it is clear that the 
order of decision context is not driving the effects. For this reason, it is valid to examine 
the predictive validity of the anxiety measures on the number of attributes considered 
prior to a decision for the different decision scenario contexts overall. Hierarchical 
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multiple regressions were conducted using STAI-S, STAI-T, and FSS scores as 
predictors for number of attributes considered for each decision scenario context. For 
each analysis, STAI-S scores were entered in the first step, followed by STAI-T scores in 
the second and FSS scores in the third (this order was chosen for the same reasons as 
mentioned in the time to make a decision analyses). Overall means and standard 
deviations for amount of information considered per decision can be found in Table 5. 
Table 5. 
Means and standard deviations for the number of attributes considered per decision for 
each decision-scenario context. 
 Mean Number of Attributes Considered per Decision 
Neutral Scenarios 1.87 (2.39) 
Uncertain Scenarios 1.96 (2.32) 
Threatening Scenarios 2.20 (2.55) 
 
 For neutral contexts, all three steps of the regression model were found to be 
significant: Step 1, F(1, 91) = 9.14, p < .01, R2 = .08; Step 2, F(2, 90) = 4.94, p < .01, R2 
= .08; and Step 3, F(3, 89) = 3.32, p = .02, R2 = .07. This is primarily driven by STAI-S 
scores predicting less consideration of attributes prior to a decision, thus as a person 
scores higher in state anxious arousal, as measured by the STAI-S, the less and less 
information they consider prior to making a decision. Neither trait anxious apprehension, 
as measured by the STAI-T, nor trait anxious arousal, as measured by the FSS, was found 
to reliably predict amount of information considered prior to a decision. For uncertain 
(Step 1, F(1, 91) = 1.80, p = .18, R2 = .01; Step 2, F(2, 90) = 1.00, p = .37, R2 = .00; and 
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Step 3, F(3, 89) = 1.08, p = .36, R2 = .00) and threatening contexts (Step 1, F(1, 91) = 
1.91, p = .17, R2 = .01; Step 2, F(2, 90) = 1.88, p = .16, R2 =.02; and Step 3, F(3, 89) = 
1.50, p = .22, R2 = .02), none of the steps of the regression model were found to be 
significant, thus none of the measures of anxiety were found to reliably predict the 
amount of information considered for these two contexts. Unstandardized and 
standardized slopes for these models can be found in Table 6.  
Table 6. 
Unstandardized slopes for the regression model predicting amount of information 
considered per decision from anxiety type for each decision scenario type with 
standardized betas in parentheses. 
 Neutral* Uncertain Threatening 
Intercept 4.14 2.17 1.93 
STAI-S -.08 (.36)** -.04 (-.16)ns -.05 (-.22)† 
STAI-T .03 (.13)ns -.001 (-.006)ns .03 (.12)ns 
FSS -.002 (-.05)ns .004 (.13)ns .004 (.10)ns 
** indicates significance at the " = .01 level 
† indicates a statistical trend (p = .07) 
 
 Again, scenario type and participant gender were checked for possible third-
variable effects on amount of information considered prior to a decision. Overall scenario 
type was examined for a main effect on number of attributes considered via a 3(TYPE) 
within-groups ANOVA. No significant effect of scenario type was found, and thus will 
not be considered for the number of attributes considered analysis. 
Effects of gender on anxiety levels on amount of information considered per 
decision were examined via the same ANCOVA as was used for time to make a decision. 
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No significant interactions or main effects of gender on number of attributes considered 
were found, thus gender was not further considered in the number of attributes considered 
analyses either. 
When comparing the findings for time to make a decision and amount of 
information considered per decision to each other it can be determined that the different 
types of anxiety have a larger effect on time to make a decision than amount of 
information considered per decision via examination of the standardized regression 
slopes for these predictors. Thus, as in individual increases in state anxious arousal 
(STAI-S scores) their decision making becomes faster and faster more because of their 
overall speed of making a decision than their tendency to consider less and less 
information per decision. Conversely, as an individual increases in trait anxious 
apprehension (STAI-T scores) their decision making becomes slower and slower more 
because of their overall slowness in making a decision than their tendency to consider 
more information per decision. 
 
Likelihood to Consider Information Rated as Important 
 To examine if anxiety type would increase or decrease the likelihood of 
examining attributes that were rated as important, a hierarchical regression was used. 
Means and standard deviations of importance ratings for each attribute type can be found 
in Table 7. For this hierarchical regression, the ratings for the attributes’ importance was 
averaged and entered in the first step, STAI-S, STAI-T, and FSS scores were entered in 
the second step, and anxiety-by-rating interaction terms were entered in the third step. 
Interaction terms were created by z-score transforming both the mean attribute rating 
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scores and the anxiety scales and then calculating the product of the z-scored variables 
(i.e. z-ratings x z-STAI-s, etc).  
Table 7. 
Means and standard deviations for how important for making a decision each attribute 
type was rated by participants. 
 Mean (SD) 
Social 3.19 (.99) 
Success 3.81 (.97) 
Happiness 3.43 (.96) 
Academic 3.58 (.99) 
 
 None of the steps predicting likelihood to look at attributes were significant, F(7, 














Unstandardized slopes for the regression model predicting likelihood to look at attributes 
from attribute importance ratings, anxiety type, and their interaction. 
 Unstandardized Slopes 
Intercept .71ns 




Rating x STAI-S .08ns 
Rating x STAI-T .13ns 
Rating x FSS -.06ns 
 
Since the effects of anxiety type on decision-making style were found to be 
strongest in the first decision scenario for the other dependent variables, the interaction 
between anxiety type and importance rating on likelihood to look at the attributes was 
examined for the first decision scenario alone using the same hierarchical regression. 
None of the model steps were found to significantly fit the data, F(7, 38) = .92, p = .51. 
Thus, no overall effect of anxiety type and importance rating on likelihood to look at the 
attributes was found for even the first decision scenario. 
As no overall effects of attribute importance rating and anxiety were found on 
likelihood to look at attributes, post-hoc exploratory analyses were conducted looking at 
the importance rating and hit rate for each attribute type individually. The same 
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hierarchical regression as above was used for these analyses. For the social and happiness 
attributes, none of the steps of the regression model significantly predicted the likelihood 
of looking at those attributes, meaning that none of the importance ratings, anxiety types, 
nor their interactions were found to reliably predict how often an individual would look at 
the social or happiness attributes. For the success attribute, all three steps of the model 
were significant: Step 1, F(1, 91) = 8.37, p < .01, R2 = .08; Step 2, F(4, 88) = 3.16, p = 
.02, R2 = .09; and Step 3, F(7, 85) = 2.57, p = .02, R2 = .11. It was found that the overall 
rating of how important the success attribute was for making a decision reliably predicted 
increased likelihood to look at the success attribute. Additionally, the interaction between 
success attribute rating and STAI-T scores was found to reliably predict increased 
likelihood to look at the success attribute, meaning that as a person scores higher in trait 
anxious apprehension, as measured by the STAI-T, the more likely they are to look at the 
success attributes if they also rated those attributes as important for making a decision. 
For the academic attribute, only the first step of the regression model was significant, 
F(1, 91) = 4.40, p = .04, R2 = .05. It was found that the overall rating of how important 
the academic attribute was for making a decision reliably predicted increased likelihood 
to look at the academic attribute; however, this increase in likelihood was not found to 









Unstandardized slopes for the regression model predicting likelihood to look at attributes 
from attribute importance ratings, anxiety type, and their interaction for each attribute 
type with standardized betas in parentheses. 
 Social Success Happiness Academic 
Intercept 1.08 .34 .49 .23 
Rating .03 (.04) .24 (.32)** .00 (.00) .13 (.19)* 
STAI-S -.005 (-.08) -.01 (-.19) -.02 (-.22) -.01 (-.16) 
STAI-T .02 (.22) .007 (.09) .01 (.18) .01 (.14) 
FSS -.002 (-.17) .00 (-.007) .001 (.12) .00 (.02) 
Rating x STAI-S .15 (.19) -.06 (-.09) .09 (.11) -.02 (-.03) 
Rating x STAI-T .08 (.11) .20 (.28)* .05 (.08) .18 (.24)† 
Rating x FSS -.07 (-.11) -.11 (-.14) -.09 (-.11) -.04 (-.05) 
** indicates significant at the " = .01 level 
* indicates significant at the " = .05 level 
† indicates a statistical trend (p = .06) 
 
 A summary of the results can be found in Table 10. 
Table 10. Summary of the predictive relationships between the different measures of 



















Positive for Success 
Attribute Only 
FSS (trait anxious 
arousal) 





Support for Hypotheses 
 The current study supported the hypothesis that anxiety type would differentially 
affect decision-making style. Specifically, support was found for anxious apprehension 
(as measured by the STAI-T) being associated with more analytic, or slow, decision 
making, while conversely, support was found for anxious arousal (as measured by the 
STAI-S) being associated with more heuristic, or rapid and less informed, decision 
making. Despite significant order effects, these patterns of decision making were 
supported by both measurements of time to make a decision and amount of information 
considered prior to making a decision at every stage of the experiment. However, no 
reliable effects were found with the variable of likelihood of considering information 
rated as important overall. These findings support the predictions of the fast/slow 
information-processing model of dual-anxiety proposed by the author. 
 Additionally, while both anxious apprehension and anxious arousal have been 
considered to be trait anxiety types by numerous researchers, the current results support a 
trait/state dichotomy of dual anxiety. This is derived by the trait scale used to measure 
anxious arousal, the FSS, never once being found to reliably predict decision-making 
behavior. Instead the state scale for anxiety, which has also been utilized to measure state 
anxious arousal, the STAI-S, was consistently found to be the strongest predictor of 
decision-making behavior.  Though this outcome will be discussed in greater detail 
below, generally this means that the insinuations that the cognitive effects of anxious 
arousal can only be observed in reaction to situational triggers is supported in this data. 
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 While the scenario contexts (neutral, uncertain, and threatening) were not found 
to have a main effect on decision-making style, anxiety type was found to interact with 
scenario context. Originally, it was predicted that the threatening decision contexts would 
elicit the strongest effects from the both anxiety types. Surprisingly, it was instead found 
that the predicted decision behaviors for anxious apprehension and anxious arousal were 
strongest in the neutral decision contexts. The same predicted behaviors were found in 
the threatening context, but at reduced effect sizes and often only for anxious arousal, and 
while the directions of the slopes matched predictions for the uncertain scenarios they 
never once were found to be significant predictors of decision-making behavior. The 
implications for these findings will be discussed. 
Measuring Different Types of Anxiety 
 In this study, the trait subscale of the STAI was used to measure trait anxious 
apprehension. This scale was found to reliably predict individuals taking more time to 
make a decision because the higher they scored in trait anxious apprehension on the STAI 
the longer overall decision time elapsed, as was predicted. Interestingly, this increase in 
time to make a decision was not found to correspond with consideration of more 
information during a decision. This suggests that rather than try to become more 
informed prior to making a decision in order to reduce uncertainty, individuals high in 
trait anxious apprehension are instead just spending more time on the same amount of 
information as individuals low in trait anxious apprehension. This pattern of decision 
making is characteristic of the difficulty in disengaging and shifting attention that has 
previously been reported for this anxiety type (Fox, et al., 2001; 2002). 
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 The FSS, on the other hand, was intended to measure trait anxious arousal. In the 
current data, this scale was never found to reliably predict decision-making style via any 
of the dependent variables assessed. Since there has been a substantial amount of research 
showing that anxious arousal can be reliably measured as a trait personality construct, 
rather than interpreting the lack of findings for the FSS as evidence for anxious arousal 
only being a state anxiety type here, it is instead more likely that the FSS is not a 
sensitive enough measure for this anxiety type. Indeed, while some anxiety researchers 
do not disambiguate trait fearfulness from trait anxiety in their research (Dien, 1999; 
O’Hare & Dien, 2008; Ohman, et al., 2001).  Others have made the claim that these are 
two different personality constructs (Sass, et al., 2009). The FSS clearly is a better 
assessment of trait fearfulness than trait anxious arousal when the content of its items are 
considered. Thus the lack of anxiety-congruent findings for this survey suggests that it 
may indeed be assessing a separate individual difference construct. Instead, another 
anxiety survey, the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (MASQ; William, Clark, 
et al., 1995) anxious arousal subscale has also been successfully used to measure trait 
anxious arousal. This survey more directly assesses an individual’s awareness of 
physiological symptoms of anxiety and reactivity (startle) to threatening stimuli rather 
than an overall measure of fearfulness, so perhaps is a more appropriate measure to use in 
future endeavors.  In future studies a different measure of anxious arousal should be used 
to test this post-hoc hypothesis. 
 State anxiety has also been treated as a measure of state anxious arousal 
(Pacheco-Unguetti, et al., 2010). Indeed, the state subscale of the STAI was found to 
consistently predict heuristic decision-making styles via shorter times to make a decision 
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and less consideration of information the higher an individual scored in state anxious 
arousal. Since these are the a priori, predicted decision-making patterns for anxious 
arousal, it seems most parsimonious to conclude that the state subscale of the STAI is 
truly assessing state anxious arousal here. This is intriguing as the trait and state 
subscales of the STAI share a number of items in common and mostly differ only on their 
directions [answer how you generally feel (trait) versus how you feel right now (state)]. 
Despite these similarities between the two subscales and their strong, positive correlation, 
opposite behavioral effects were found for each. This suggests that while there is some 
shared variance between the two, there is also some unique variance that is able to better 
discriminate between anxious apprehension and anxious arousal.  
 The state anxious arousal that the STAI-S is believed to be assessing in this study 
is different from the state anxiety that was predicted to come from the uncertain and 
threatening decision scenario contexts. Originally, it was predicted that these different 
contexts, especially the uncertain and threatening contexts, would elicit varying levels of 
state anxious arousal and anxious apprehension on their own. Instead, no main effects of 
decision scenario context were found, and neutral contexts were found to elicit the 
strongest anxiety effects on decision-making style. This lack of main effect of scenario 
context is also reflected in the lack of differences in the mood manipulation checks that 
followed each decision scenario. Based on the current data, the state anxious arousal 
effects found here seem more global than the individual decision scenarios and possibly 
reflect the increase in anxious arousal experienced from the overall experiment situation. 
As the actual experience of being in a laboratory and completing the decision tasks is 
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more ecologically valid than the attempt to put oneself in the different scenarios, this 
result is not surprising. 
Neutral versus Threatening versus Uncertain Scenarios 
 Again, there was an unexpected interaction between anxiety type and decision 
scenario context such that neutral scenarios elicited the strongest effects followed by 
threatening scenarios, while no effects were found for uncertain scenarios. The neutral 
decision scenarios differed from the threatening and uncertain in that only basic, factual 
information was provided for each neutral scenario (e.g. The class takes place in the early 
afternoon in a building that is in the center of campus.”), leaving out any information 
regarding how the individual him or herself was doing in that scenario [e.g. Your class 
has just taken a stressful midterm, and you are afraid that you did not do well at all 
(threatening).]. In retrospect, this complete lack of personal performance information 
could have created a situation of heightened uncertainty for individuals high in anxious 
apprehension and anxious arousal, resulting in an increase in their different information-
processing styles compared to the threatening and uncertain scenarios, where personal 
performance context was provided. 
 Another possible explanation for why anxiety effects were strongest in the neutral 
scenarios comes from research on anxiety and cognitive load (Bishop, Jenkins & 
Lawrence, 2007). In a non-emotional task, no differences in brain activation patterns 
were found for individuals high in trait anxiety versus state anxiety when under a high 
cognitive load. However, when the cognitive load was reduced, individuals high in trait 
anxiety were found to show a reduction in recruitment of the prefrontal cortex, and 
individuals high in state anxiety were found to show an increase in recruitment of the 
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amygdala. Applying this finding to the current study, it is possible that the threatening 
and uncertain contexts created higher cognitive and emotional loads for individuals high 
in anxious apprehension (trait anxiety) and anxious arousal (state anxiety), as they were 
better able to engage the material and invest themselves in the scenarios. This additional 
recruitment of resources elicited by the more personal context of these scenarios may 
have in turn washed out any of the anxiety-type specific effects predicted for decision-
making style. Conversely, the lack of personal context in the neutral scenarios may have 
kept participants from thoroughly engaging the material, resulting in a lower cognitive 
load than the other scenarios. In turn, this lower-load situation allowed for the predicted 
differences in decision-making style between anxious apprehension and anxious arousal 
to be observed.  
Likelihood to Consider Information Rated as Important 
 In previous MADM studies on mood and decision-making style (Isen & Means, 
1983), heuristic decision making was associated with a decrease in likelihood to consider 
information that had been rated as unimportant, while analytic decision making was 
found to lead to an increased likelihood to consider all information, regardless of 
importance. Importance ratings and anxiety types were not found to easily predict 
likelihood to consider information in this study. Overall, neither was found to 
significantly predict how often an individual would look at the attributes. When each of 
the four attribute types was analyzed individually, trait anxious apprehension and 
importance ratings were found to interact to predict an increase in consideration of the 
success attribute. Thus, the higher an individual scored in trait anxious apprehension, the 
more likely they were to consider the success attribute if they had also rated it as 
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important to their overall decision outcome. While this finding is congruent with the 
increased time to make a decision also associated with trait anxious apprehension, it does 
not address the likelihood to consider information considered important in the same way 
as was intended.  
 The importance of an attribute in making an overall decision was rated for each 
attribute type individually on a 5-point Likert scale. Admittedly, assessing this variable in 
this manner failed to have the participants directly compare the different attribute types to 
each other, and thus the original logistic regression that was planned for this analysis was 
not possible. It would have been more appropriate to have the participants rank the four 
attribute types in order of importance to more properly assess changes in the likelihood to 
look at more important information versus less by creating the categories of first, second, 
third, and forth ranked types of attributes that are considered important for making a 
decision. 
Dual-Anxiety and Information Processing Patterns 
 Traditionally, the cognitive impact of anxious apprehension and anxious arousal 
has been studied and described within the context of early differences in attentional 
engagement and basic attentional control (e.g. Dien, 1999; Engel, et al., 2008; 2010; 
MacLeod, Mathews & Tata, 1986). Overall, individuals high in anxious apprehension are 
found to have a slower information-processing style that results in difficulty disengaging 
attention from distracting stimuli and making response selections, while individuals high 
in anxious arousal are found to have a faster information-processing style that results in 
speeded engagement of attention to stimuli, better inhibition of distracting stimuli, and 
consequently more rapid response selection. The author has summarized these findings in 
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a proposes fast/slow information-processing model for dual-anxiety, in which increases 
in anxious arousal are generally associated with increases in speed of information 
processing, particularly when in the presence of a negative stimulus, and increases in 
anxious apprehension are associated with decreases in speed of information processing, 
again, particularly when in the presence of a negative stimulus. While brain imaging data 
suggests that different anxiety types should differentially impact higher-order cognitive 
processes (Bishop, Jenkins & Lawrence, 2007; Engels, et al., 2010), this has never been 
directly tested.  
The current study’s findings suggested that the slower information-processing 
styles associated with anxious apprehension and the faster information-processing styles 
associated with anxious arousal matriculate further down the cognitive stream than 
attention and inhibition processes that occur within a few hundred milliseconds to multi-
step, complex cognitive processes typically thought to be carried out by more top-down 
networks. Since the increase in slower decision making predicted from increases in 
anxious apprehension found in this study did not correspond with increases in the amount 
of information considered per decision, it could be argued that increases in anxious 
apprehension do not predict increases in analytical decision-making styles (the processes 
of becoming better informed), but rather, decreases in the speed of information 
processing in general. Thus, the dichotomy of fast versus slow information processing 
associated with anxious arousal and anxious apprehension proposed by the author may be 
a more accurate way to describe the impact of dual-anxiety on decision-making behavior 
than the dichotomy of heuristic versus analytic styles. This finding opens up a wealth of 
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areas to investigate the full nature to which anxious apprehension and anxious arousal 
differentially impact executive functioning. 
Directions for Further Study 
 Since this is the first study to integrate repeated-measures of decision context in a 
multi-attribute design with individual difference measurement of anxiety, replication is 
needed for the current results. The question as to whether or not the state mood 
manipulation caused by the emotional context of a decision can induce a temporary state 
of anxious apprehension or anxious arousal and their associated decision-making styles 
could not be fully answered by this study. This is due to the scenario contexts not 
eliciting strong changes in mood. Thus, it still could be possible that a decision that is 
uncertain in context could temporarily increase analytic decision-making in individuals 
who are not high in trait anxious apprehension to begin with. Additionally, it still could 
be possible that a decision that is threatening in context could temporarily increase 
heuristic decision-making in individuals who are not high in anxious arousal. There are 
three different approaches that could be used individually or in combination to address 
this issue. First, more salient mood inductions could be used, as has been done in the 
majority of the mood and decision-making literature. These more salient mood inductions 
could include imagery and narratives that have been found to reliably induce negative 
emotions, such as the International Affective Picture Scale (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 2005) images and/or threat of shock or punishment to induce the physiological 
responses to immediate stress. While removing the mood induction from the decision 
context itself loses some of the ecological validity of the findings, it may gain the desired 
state mood effects. Second, a different set of decision scenarios could be developed that 
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more reliably influence an individual’s state mood. Thirdly, despite increasing the 
amount of noise from individual difference variables that are not of interest, a between-
groups design could be used rather than within to see if the mood influences of the 
different scenario contexts are more salient when they are experienced in isolation rather 
than one after the other. 
Nonetheless, despite not finding evidence for the decision scenario contexts 
manipulating state mood in this study, there were still differences in the magnitude of the 
effects of anxiety type on decision-making style for the three contexts. As has already 
been discussed, these differences could come from the lack of personal information or 
cognitive load associated with the neutral scenarios. This finding may provide support for 
not needing elaborate emotional stimuli for the investigation of dual-anxiety impacts on 
higher-order cognition, as the increased load from the emotional context may in fact 
drown out the differences between the two anxiety types. Not needing to develop 
emotional stimuli could greatly reduce the confounds that are introduced to a study when 
individuals are asked to interpret and react to different emotional stimuli, as what one 
individual considers threatening versus another can greatly differ. 
 Another promising area of future investigation is on the actual cost and benefit of 
each of the decision-making styles associated with each of the anxiety types. While it is 
tempting to conclude that heuristic decision-making styles are more adaptive than 
analytical in the current paradigm, the actual decision outcomes were irrelevant for the 
purposes of this study. It is possible that had their been choice options that were more 
desirable than others, individuals utilizing heuristic decision-making styles would have 
made less beneficial decisions by not considering all the information associated with a 
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choice. On the other hand, it is also possible that individuals utilizing an analytic 
decision-making style could become overwhelmed by the amount of information 
available and end up making sub-optimal decisions based on irrelevant information 
(Dijksterhuis, et al., 2006). Thus, a follow-up study in which the choice options in the 
forced two-choice decisions were weighted in such a way that one actually was a more 
desirable choice would be highly informative. Additionally, varying the amount of 
information available for the different decisions could possibly reveal a threshold for 
which one decision-making style becomes more adaptive than the other, i.e. the point at 
which there is too much information to consider it analytically and heuristic, “gut” 
choices become more optimal.  
Implications 
 In this study, anxious apprehension and anxious arousal are found to reliably 
predict information-processing patterns in a complex, multi-step task, and the effects of 
these two anxiety types are found to be strongest following neutral contexts. This finding 
supports an interactive approach to studying cognition as has been done in personality 
research. As such, truly descriptive cognitive models would need to be able to account for 
varying levels of individual differences, such as anxiety types, different contexts in which 
those individual will be acting, such as neutral versus threatening, and the interaction 
between the individual differences and the environment before being considered 
complete. While this requires much more complex versions of cognitive models, it also 
provides for models that will better account for the effects seen when applied across 
different individuals and settings.  
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 Additionally, the finding that the effects of anxiety on decision-making style are 
strongest in neutral contexts suggests two things. First, that the development of emotional 
stimuli to disambiguate the cognitive and behavioral effects of anxious apprehension and 
anxious arousal may be unnecessary. Secondly, and more importantly, that while it is a 
common assumption that using your emotions rather than your cold, hard reasoning to 
make decisions will lead to better decision outcomes, having emotion involved in the 
decision-making context might actually lead to more adaptive decision behavior. This 
suggestion is in line with the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (Damasio, Tranel and Damasio, 
1991). This hypothesis has shown that early, emotional responses to information inform 
decision-making strategies towards more optimal outcomes. Thus, if extreme heuristic 
and analytic decision-making styles can be maladaptive in high-anxiety individuals, and 
emotional decision contexts tend to bring both of these styles towards the middle, than it 
is actually in non-emotional decision contexts in which decision behavior becomes 
suboptimal.  
 One application of this work is that knowing how an individual may behave in 
different decision contexts due to their individual levels of anxious apprehension and 
anxious arousal can also lead to the development of better decision contexts. For 
instance, if an individual is known to be high in anxious apprehension, one might want to 
limit the amount of information provided and the importance of the information provided 
to that individual when they need to make a decision to keep their analytic decision-
making style from completely overwhelming them during the decision process. 
Conversely, if an individual is known to be high in anxious arousal, one might want to 
force that individual to consider the important aspects of the available options involved in 
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a decision before they can make a choice, to help them avoid letting their heuristic 
decision-making style make them hasty and ill-informed decision makers. Such 
individualized settings for how information is presented when a decision needs to be 
made can help professionals such as physicians, lawyers, and insurance agents guide their 
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Decision Scenarios, Two-Choice Options, and Attributes 
Scenario 1: Classroom Performance 
 Neutral Condition. 
 It is halfway through the semester. You are enrolled in a class that is in your 
major. Your instructor is new, as is your textbook. So far, you have covered six chapters 
worth of material and just had your midterm exam. The class takes place in the early 
afternoon in a building that is in the center of campus.  
 Uncertain Condition. 
It is halfway through the semester. You are enrolled in a class that is a 
requirement for your major. Your instructor is known to be tough, but you have friends 
that have passed the class in the past. You have to read from a dense, complicated 
textbook on which you’re quizzed regularly. Your class has just finished the midterm 
exam, and you do not know how you did. The instructor has indicated that the grades on 
the exam are not good, but is still deciding whether or not to curve them.  
Threatening Condition. 
It is halfway through the semester. You are enrolled in a class that you hate, but it 
is a requirement for your major. Your instructor is incredibly tough and has very high 
performance requirements in order to succeed in this class. You have tried to read the 
textbook to help your learning, but it is a nightmare, and you often don’t understand it. 
Your class has just taken a stressful midterm, and you are afraid that you did not do well 
at all. Failing this class would result in you being kicked-out of your major and being put 
on academic probation. What’s worse, if you were unable to pass the class after retaking 
it, you would be in danger of losing your scholarship. 
1. Social choice pair 1:  
a. Choice A: “Attend a friend’s house party this weekend” 
i. Social attribute: You will get to spend some time with a 
group of good friends that you really enjoy and probably 
will meet some new people. 
ii. Personal success attribute: Your next exam in class isn’t for 
a while, but you will miss out on preparing for class ahead 
of time, which ultimately would have helped you learn the 
next section much better. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: You really need to blow off 
some steam and hanging out with this group of friends is 
usually fun and drama-free. 
iv. Academic attribute: Attending the party in no way 
improves your grade for this course. If anything, you miss 
out on precious time to keep up to speed on class material.  
b. Choice B: “Take in a movie with your roommate this weekend” 
i. Social attribute: Your friend would feel snubbed if you 
didn’t attend the party, and you’d miss out on meeting new 
people. You’ll probably also be made fun of for being a 
stick-in-the-mud by your other friends.  
ii. Personal success attribute: Only seeing a movie this 
weekend would still allow you time to do some reading for 
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class, which would put you ahead for the upcoming week, 
and make the new section easier to learn. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: You would get to relax for a 
little bit, but you’ll feel regret for not going to the party. 
Despite getting time to relax and work over the weekend, 
you’ll feel self-pity for having missed out on all the fun. 
iv. Academic attribute: Having some extra time to work on 
stuff for class would really help you get through this next 
section. Being prepared for class the next week would also 
improve your relationship with your instructor, which 
would make things go easier in class for you. 
2. Social choice pair 2: 
a. Choice A: “go on an all-day shopping trip with friends” 
i. Social attribute: You will have a great time hanging out 
with your friends and will start forming some stronger 
bonds with them as you have more and more experiences 
together. 
ii. Personal success attribute: Not only do you miss out on 
precious studying time for class, but you spend more 
money than you should have, which adds additional stress 
to the rest of your semester. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: You feel relaxed and gratified 
by the enjoyable time spent with your friends. You also buy 
some new electronics that keep you well entertained, and 
other people stop by your room to play with them. 
iv. Academic attribute: Your class performance slightly 
decreases as you get behind in your reading and end up 
spending some of your studying time playing with your 
new electronics. Also, the new stress of being in a financial 
pinch does not help your focus during class. 
b. Choice B: “spend the weekend talking on the phone with friends 
from high school” 
i. Social attribute: You enjoy catching up with some of your 
friends that you no longer get to see now that you’re in 
college, and you make plans to meet up with them during 
the next break. However, you alienate yourself a bit from 
your new friends by not spending time with them. 
ii. Personal success attribute: Since you spend most of the 
weekend in your room on the phone, you do manage to 
squeeze in some study time between calls. This isn’t 
enough to really make you ready for class the next week, 
but you at least have a general idea of what topics you’ll be 
discussing. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: Talking with old friends 
makes you a bit homesick and lonely. You are reminded of 
how easy and carefree life used to be and start feeling a bit 
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down about your new responsibilities and their stressors in 
college. 
iv. Academic attribute: Spending your time studying instead of 
on the phone never hurts your class grade, but one weekend 
of light studying doesn’t really hurt you too badly. The 
class remains just as demanding as it was for you before. 
3. Information-gathering pair 1: 
a. Choice A: “Set up a meeting with your instructor to discuss the 
class” 
i. Social attribute: Some of your friends respect you for 
taking your course seriously and being proactive in trying 
to improve your performance. Other friends think that 
you’re being kind of lame and a teacher’s pet. 
ii. Personal success attribute: Your instructor helps you to 
better understand some of the class concepts with which 
you were struggling and gives you some tips on how to 
better prepare for the next exam. This will inevitably help 
out your performance on the next exam. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: It becomes pretty obvious 
during your meeting that you’re not doing as well as you 
had hoped in the class. This means that you’re in for a lot 
of hard work in order to get a good grade for the semester. 
Your stress levels are going to be way up. 
iv.  Academic attribute: Meeting with the instructor does start 
to improve your grade, as you have a better understanding 
of what you need to do to succeed in this class. 
b. Choice B: “Look through the book to check the answers you think 
you missed” 
i. Social attribute: It doesn’t take long to get a good idea of 
where you stand on the midterm exam. This leaves you 
plenty of time to still hang out with your friends and relax. 
ii. Personal success attribute: While you now realize where 
you made mistakes on your midterm, there is nothing you 
can do about them now except try not to repeat them on the 
final exam. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: You realize that you may have 
done better than you expected on the exam. This lifts your 
spirits and you become more optimistic about your final 
grade for this course.  
iv. Academic attribute: One of the best ways to learn material 
is to go back and see where you’ve made mistakes and 
why. Taking the time to do this on the midterm will help 
your understanding of the material for the rest of the class. 
4. Information-gathering pair 2: 
a. Choice A: “Meet with a classmate to go over the exam” 
65 
 
i. Social attribute: You at least now know someone in your 
class a little better, but while the two of you are comparing 
notes to see where you may have made mistakes on the 
midterm your real friends are out enjoying themselves. 
ii. Personal success attribute: Meeting with another student 
from class just makes you realize how much you’re not 
understanding of the course material. This helps motivate 
you to start studying harder for the final exam. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: Having another student help 
your find where you made mistakes is stressful and now 
you’re really worried about what your final grade will be 
for this class. 
iv. Academic attribute: Spending time going over the material 
with another student is a good way to relearn the topics on 
which you were confused. This new understanding will 
help you out as the class moves on to material that builds 
on the old stuff. 
b. Choice B: “Email your TA about topics you still don’t understand” 
i. Social attribute: You spend the evening going back and 
forth with your TA over email and don’t get to spend any 
time with your friends. 
ii. Personal success attribute: Being proactive about your 
performance in class helps motivate you to study harder for 
the next exam. You also get to understanding some of the 
course material better than you would had if you had only 
relied on yourself to learn them. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: You feel better about yourself 
and more confident in your ability to get a good grade in 
this class, but you also realize how much work it’s going to 
take, which keeps you pretty stressed out. 
iv. Academic attribute: You start to do better in class and are 
understanding the information better and better as the TA 
helps you with some of the trickier material. 
5. Threat reducing pair 1: 
a. Choice A: “Join a study group for your class” 
i. Social attribute: You get to know some of your classmates 
better, which makes actually attending class more fun as 
well. However, you do have to miss out on a lot of 
evenings with your friends. 
ii. Personal success attribute: The study group provides 
several different ways of learning the class material, which 
means that you are starting to get the hang of concepts that 
were confusing for you before. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: The study group takes a lot of 
your personal time, so you are unable to do things that you 
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really enjoy, like going to the gym and hanging out with 
friends. You start to feel kind of lonely. 
iv. Academic attribute: Your learning class concepts in much 
more depth and detail, which is paying off in class. You’re 
able to readily answer most of the instructor’s questions 
during lecture, and you’re feeling certain that you’ll do 
better on the next exam. 
b. Choice B: “Hire a tutor to help you with the class” 
i. Social attribute: The tutor is only available on the 
weekends, so that is how you now get to spend your 
Saturday and Sunday afternoons. This means that you’re 
not really getting to go out with friends at all. 
ii. Personal success attribute: You are really starting to 
understand the course material well. As far as the 
classroom goes, you feel confident and excited about what 
else your major has to offer. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: Your self-satisfaction with 
your performance in class is a trade off for your self-
satisfaction as a person. You’re spending a lot of your time 
studying and not much time having any fun. 
iv. Academic attribute: Seeing a tutor will definitely pay off in 
the end. You are doing homework without too much effort 
and are having an easier time reading the book. You’re 
feeling pretty good about the next exam. 
6. Threat reducing pair 2: 
a. Choice A: “Start seeing your TA on a regular basis for help with 
class work” 
i. Social attribute: Seeing a TA does nothing for your social 
status. You end up having to cancel on plans with your 
friends pretty frequently so that you can keep meetings 
with your TA. 
ii. Personal success attribute: You start to understand the 
course material much better, although your TA doesn’t 
know all the concepts as well as you’d hoped. There are 
still some things that you just can’t seem to grasp. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: Your TA isn’t a very social 
personal and spending time with them isn’t very enjoyable. 
This and sometimes they confuse you even worse than 
before, so class can feel a lot more stressful. 
iv. Academic attribute: Overall you seem to be performing in 
class better. You’re pretty sure that you’ll improve on the 
next exam. 
b. Choice B: “Start spending all of your free time studying for this 
course” 
i. Social attribute: This will be at the cost of your social life. 
You’ll lose contact with a lot of your friends and rarely 
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have time to hang out and have fun. Your relationship with 
your roommate will also deteriorate, as they have to 
constantly be keeping your room a study environment. 
ii. Personal success attribute: You are starting to feel more 
confident about your understanding of the course material, 
but you’re getting less sleep than usual which is affecting 
how well you can pay attention during class. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: All the studying makes you 
pretty miserable. You’re stressed out about class and 
getting enough sleep all the time. You also rarely take a 
break to have fun. 
iv. Academic attribute: All the studying really pays off. You 
do really well on the next homework assignment, and your 
comprehension while reading the textbook has really 
improved. You will definitely be getting a higher grade on 
the final exam. 
7. No action pair 1: 
a. Choice A: “Apply to live off campus next year” 
i. Social attribute: All of your friends are excited at the 
prospect of having somewhere to hangout without campus 
rules and resident assistants telling you what to do. You’ll 
be moving with a friend you made when you first got to 
college, and the experience will be sure to make you 
friends for life. 
ii. Personal success attribute: Your study habits and 
performance in class will pretty much stay the same as 
before. You’ll have to factor the additional time it will take 
you to get to class in to your schedule, but maybe you can 
get some reading done while riding the bus. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: The prospect of really being 
on your own and responsible for your life is very exciting. 
You can’t wait to get to decorate your own space and have 
no one else to whom you have to answer. 
iv. Academic attribute: Living off of campus would also mean 
removing yourself from the academic environment. You’ll 
have to be even more responsible and self-motivated to 
make sure that you get your coursework done and make it 
to class regularly. 
b. Choice B: “Apply to move to a nicer dorm next year” 
i. Social attribute: You know a lot of the people that already 
live in the nicer dorm, so you’ll be closer to your friends. 
Your current roommate is applying to move with you, so 
you don’t run the risk of getting assigned to someone with 
whom you don’t get along. 
ii. Personal success attribute: Staying on campus makes it 
easier to attend classes, get to computer labs, and study in 
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the library. Also, the study restrictions that come with the 
dorms make it socially acceptable for you to be spending 
time with your books every night. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: Staying on campus does mean 
that there are still a lot of noise regulations and rules 
regarding who you can have in your room. Your resident 
assistant can often cut your fun short when it starts to get 
late.  
iv. Academic attribute: As you really sink in to the routine of 
living on campus, your performance as a student goes up a 
bit. You have your spot in the library where your study, 
know when your dorm’s computer lab isn’t busy, and can 
get up fifteen minutes before class starts and still make it. 
8. No action pair 2: 
a. Choice A: “Spend the afternoon in a new coffee shop in town” 
i. Social attribute: You discover a great new place to hang 
out. Hopefully your friends like it too. 
ii. Personal success attribute: While not even intending to, all 
the down time in the coffee shop leads you to do some 
reading for class, so now you’re a bit ahead of the game for 
next week. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: It’s good to spend some time 
relaxing, and you’ll be able to approach classes tomorrow 
with some renewed energy. 
iv. Academic attribute: While this coffee shop may make a 
good place to stay caffeinated and study, one afternoon 
there is not really going to affect how you’re doing in 
classes. 
b. Choice B: “Go for a walk around campus” 
i. Social attribute: Having a little alone time never hurt, but 
your friends think it’s kind of weird that you decided to just 
wander around alone. 
ii. Personal success attribute: You find a shorter route for 
getting between two of your classes. This should help keep 
you from showing up late for the second one. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: Getting a chance to clear your 
mind and get a little exercise makes you feel better about 
life in general. You start to think that you’ll be able to get 
through this semester okay. 
iv. Academic attribute: Taking an afternoon off doesn’t really 
impact your grade in your class. You obviously can’t do 
this too often, or you will start to get behind. 
Scenario 2: Student Government President 
 Neutral Condition.  
You are the current acting student body president. You have to allocate the annual 
budget to the different student groups and activities on campus for the year. Your budget 
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and the funds that groups are requesting are identical to the previous year. There are new 
student senate members, but they hold similar positions to last year’s members. The kinds 
of groups requesting funds include honors societies, Greek societies, ethnic societies, and 
special interest societies. 
 Uncertain Condition.  
You are the current acting student body president. You have to allocate the annual 
budget to the different student groups and activities on campus for the year. The state’s 
senate, who votes on how much money will be given to student governments of state 
schools, has not yet voted on how much to allow this year. Yet, you need to start 
allocating money immediately. Additionally, your school has a new chancellor who has 
voiced his dislike of students getting to make any decisions about university money. You 
are worried that if you do not make good decisions, he may take away your right to 
distribute money to student groups. 
Threatening Condition. 
You are the current acting student body president. You have to allocate the annual 
budget to the different student groups and activities on campus for the year. The requests 
for funding are much more than what is available. If certain student groups don’t get the 
money they need, they will not survive, which could cause a war in the student senate. 
The chancellor is considering you for an internship, but will base his decision on your 
performance as a student leader. If you fail, the career path you have set out on will be 
destroyed.   
1. Social choice pair 1:  
a. Choice A: “Set up an informal student dinner where members from 
student groups can discuss funding needs” 
i. Social attribute: Meeting a bunch of members of student 
groups face-to-face will really improve your image as an 
active and concerned student leader, regardless of the 
funding decisions you make later. This will certainly 
increase your popularity on campus. 
ii. Personal success attribute: Every student group seems to 
have a legitimate reason for requesting funding from the 
student government. Meeting them all in person is not 
going to help make your decisions any easier this year, and 
now that they personally know you they won’t hesitate to 
contact you all the time for help. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: You can tell that people are 
impressed at your ability to organize events on campus. 
This makes you even more confident in your ability to 
succeed this year. 
iv. Academic attribute: The extra time you have to put in to 
organizing and hosting the dinner really cuts in to time that 
should be spent studying for classes. You need to do well 
as a student leader, but you also can’t let your class grades 
start to fall.  
b. Choice B: “Start an online discussion board forum for members of 
student groups to state their cases for needing funding” 
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i. Social attribute: You get to hear from a lot more student 
group members, but you don’t meet any of them 
personally. Your social status does not really change as a 
result. 
ii. Personal success attribute: People are a lot more articulate 
at expressing their needs when they have time to sit down 
and think about what they’re going to say. You are much 
better informed on the specific needs of each group, which 
should help you better allocate the funding. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: The discussion board is 
updated frequently, so you have to spend a lot of time 
checking up on it to keep abreast of all the groups’ 
concerns. You do this mostly by yourself, and it can be dull 
and tedious work. 
iv. Academic attribute: The time taken to give each 
contribution to the discussion board a fair amount of 
consideration is cutting in to your study time. You have to 
be careful to not let your aspirations as a student leader 
hinder your performance in the classroom. 
2. Social choice pair 2: 
a. Choice A: “Fund the student groups that you know have a lot of 
social influence” 
i. Social attribute: This will make you a hit with some of the 
larger, more powerful groups on campus, such as the Greek 
communities. Your popularity on campus will increase in 
general, but you will also make some enemies out of the 
lesser-supported groups, such as the percussion or law 
clubs. 
ii. Personal success attribute: Giving such influential groups 
what they want helps you out with your internship with the 
chancellor, as they can pressure him too about hiring you. 
However, several student government members who were 
advocating for the smaller student groups are now causing 
you problems with other things you’d like to accomplish 
with the student government. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: While it feels good to have a 
large group of people on campus happy with you, you do 
have guilt about only funding groups that could help you 
through their social influence.  
iv. Academic attribute: Making the funding decision doesn’t 
have a direct impact on your academic performance. 
You’re just glad the decision is over with so that you can 
refocus some energy on class. 
b. Choice B: “Fund the student groups of which your friends and 
yourself are members” 
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i. Social attribute: This will make you wildly popular in all of 
the student groups for which you have a membership. You 
make your existing friends happy with the decision and will 
be bound to make a lot more friends within these groups. 
ii. Personal success attribute: The chancellor is fully aware 
that you are a member of all the groups funded and is not 
happy with this decision. What he sees as an abuse of 
power will influence his decision on whether or not to give 
you an internship. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: This makes your time spent 
with your friends and personal student groups great, as you 
are popular and you have the funds to do whatever you like. 
However, members of the student government are very 
annoyed with you and leading them is becoming a 
miserable experience. 
iv. Academic attribute: This doesn’t really impact your 
academic performance. You’re just hoping that you can 
attend class without hearing a member from an unfunded 
group complain. 
3. Information-gathering pair 1: 
a. Choice A: “Form a student senate committee to compile all the 
information on funding requests and prioritize them” 
i. Social attribute: Delegating some of the funding decision 
responsibilities to other student senate members gives you 
some more time to hang out with your friends and have a 
bit of a social life. 
ii. Personal success attribute: While top priorities are easily 
pulled out of the list of funding requests, there are a lot of 
requests that fall within the same priority. You’ll be able to 
make the initial funding decisions easily, but after that they 
will be very hard to choose between. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: Your very pleased with how 
you handled the responsibility, and think that you are doing 
a great job delegating within the student senate.  
iv.  Academic attribute: This takes some of the pressure off of 
you during the funding decision process, allowing you to 
have more time to focus on classes. It can be very difficult 
to juggle the responsibilities of student government and 
class at the same time. 
b. Choice B: “Create a database of funding student groups have 
received in the past and what they did with them” 
i. Social attribute: This is a very time-consuming project that 
takes up all your free time for days. Your friends begin to 




ii. Personal success attribute: This allows you to become very 
well informed on how the groups requesting funds will 
likely spend them. You are able to form a rough list of 
which groups do the best with the funds they are given and 
which do the worst, and this knowledge should help make 
the funding decision a bit smoother. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: This will take a lot of time 
and effort on your part, which will be exhausting. You’re 
going to be stressed and irritable until this funding decision 
is over. 
iv. Academic attribute: This will greatly detract from your 
ability to study and prepare for your classes. You will 
probably get behind on your coursework, and you’ll just 
have to hope that you have time to catch up after the 
funding decision is over. 
4. Information-gathering pair 2: 
a. Choice A: “Attend a state senate meeting to get a feel for how they 
make funding decisions” 
i. Social attribute: While other student senate members 
admire you for taking such initiative, this action goes 
generally unnoticed by the rest of the student body. Your 
popularity on campus is relatively unaffected. 
ii. Personal success attribute: The state senate hearings are 
even longer and less productive than your own student 
senate meetings. You don’t really gain any insight into how 
to make your own funding decisions.  
iii. Personal happiness attribute: Seeing how a state senate 
struggles with such decisions just further frustrates you 
with your own. You’re exasperated with the task and 
wondering if this is really the career path you want to 
pursue.  
iv. Academic attribute: During some of the slower parts of the 
senate meeting you’re able to sneak in some reading for 
class, so you manage not to get behind despite taking the 
extra time to do this. 
b. Choice B: “Ask the chancellor to meet with you to discuss funding 
options” 
i. Social attribute: The majority of student senate does not 
want to give up any of their autonomy to the chancellor. 
They see this move as you sucking up and having the 
chancellor make decisions for you. 
ii. Personal success attribute: This increases the chancellor’s 
opinion of you highly, and makes him even more willing to 
give you an internship in his office. It also makes the 
funding decision much easier for you. 
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iii. Personal happiness attribute: The discontented student 
senate is making you feel guilty about your decision. Your 
not sure if you’re going to enjoy leading them after this. 
iv. Academic attribute: Sharing the decision process with the 
chancellor gives you more time to focus on class. You can 
stay on top of your coursework and get the funding 
allocated this way. 
5. Threat reducing pair 1: 
a. Choice A: “Put all funding decisions to a senate vote” 
i. Social attribute: This makes you more popular in the 
senate, as you seem to be less of a control freak.  
ii. Personal success attribute: Letting the entire senate have a 
vote means that individuals can push for the student groups 
that they are involved in. This may lead to some unfair 
funding decisions. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: This option takes a lot of the 
burden off of your shoulders. This leaves you more time to 
concentrate on other duties, but also makes you feel like 
you shrugged-off some of your responsibilities. 
iv. Academic attribute: This gives you a lot more time to study 
and be a student. Your performance in class would benefit 
from this. 
b. Choice B: “Decide to fund only the largest student organizations” 
i. Social attribute: This makes you very popular among the 
bigger groups on campus, but creates an uprising in the 
smaller groups that feel unfairly treated. They can do a lot 
to hurt your appearance on campus. 
ii. Personal success attribute: The groups that get funded are 
the ones that have the best alumni base and hold the most 
sway on campus. They can really help you look good in 
front of the chancellor and other possible employers. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: You feel pretty lousy about 
making decisions based on popularity rather than need. 
You do not enjoy how angry you’ve made the smaller 
groups on campus. 
iv. Academic attribute: Getting the decision over with gives 
you more time to focus in class, and you have a lot more 
study-mates with all the new friends from the larger student 
groups.  
6. Threat reducing pair 2: 
a. Choice A: “Start a student-senate ran fundraiser that can contribute 
to this year’s budget” 
i. Social attribute: Running the fundraiser would put you out 
in the eye of the student body more frequently. More face 
time with them means more popularity for you, regardless 
of the funding decisions you make. 
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ii. Personal success attribute: The ability to come up with 
ways to fund the groups that rely on you is considered very 
desirable in the political arena. This makes you much more 
likely to get the internship you’ve for which you’ve been 
gunning. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: The fundraising work is 
rewarding and every penny you raise takes some of the 
stress out of the funding decisions you have to make. It is 
time-consuming work, however. 
iv. Academic attribute: Now you have to squeeze in a couple 
extra hours every day for the fundraiser on top of your 
other duties as student body president, classes, and 
homework time. Staying current with your classes will get 
more and more difficult. 
b. Choice B: “Start an alumni donation campaign to supplement this 
year’s budget” 
i. Social attribute: You spend most of your free time talking 
to alumni rather than your peers. While you’re doing good 
things for your student organizations, you’re not having 
much of a social life. 
ii. Personal success attribute: You meet a lot of influential 
alumni as you contact them for donations. A few of them 
take an interest in you and put in a few good words with the 
chancellor. This greatly helps your chances of getting the 
internship you want. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: You’re thrilled that the more 
money you can get donated the less difficult funding 
decisions you’ll have to make. You’re also very excited 
about the networking opportunities with alums. 
iv. Academic attribute: Spending all your time visiting or on 
the phone with potential donors is really costing you in the 
classroom. You’re behind on all your course reading and 
occasionally have to miss class to make donor meetings. 
7. No action pair 1: 
a. Choice A: “Start a new student senate social committee” 
i. Social attribute: This results in there being more social 
events arranged for members of the student senate. As you 
get to spend more time with them, you begin to make some 
very good friends. 
ii. Personal success attribute: This does nothing to help make 
your funding decisions any easier. It also doesn’t contribute 
to how successful of a student leader you are seen as. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: Being more social with the 
other student government members with whom you have to 
work makes the overall experience of student body 
president more enjoyable for you. 
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iv. Academic attribute: Spending more time socializing with 
student senate members detracts a bit from your class work, 
but not in a very remarkable way. 
b. Choice B: “Rework your campaign slogan to accompany your 
electronic email signature” 
i. Social attribute: This does not do anything to increase your 
popularity as a student leader. 
ii. Personal success attribute: While the catchy slogan is easily 
recalled by all who read your emails, you really haven’t 
done anything to represent what the slogan claims. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: This is a fun and amusing 
activity for you and adds some personal pride to the emails 
you send out. 
iv. Academic attribute: This is a quick task and doesn’t impact 
your academic performance in the least.  
8. No action pair 2: 
a. Choice A: “Arrange for the student senate to have group photos 
taken” 
i. Social attribute: Other student senate members are excited 
to have something by which they can remember this time in 
their lives. The rest of the student body views it as 
somewhat vain and a waste of senate funds. 
ii. Personal success attribute: Having photos taken of you with 
the senate you oversee is not something that is going to 
help you progress in the political arena. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: You are very proud of your 
accomplishments and truly cherish the keepsake. You also 
greatly enjoy walking by the images in the Union every 
day. 
iv. Academic attribute: Taking photos with the student senate 
is a pretty quick affair, leaving you plenty of time to tend to 
your daily coursework and studying.  
b. Choice B: “Start a Facebook group account for the student senate” 
i. Social attribute: This makes it much easier for the rest of 
the student body to make commentary on how they think 
the student senate and yourself are performing, however, 
this brings out the praisers and the haters alike. 
ii. Personal success attribute: The chancellor likes that you’re 
opening up the student senate on a public forum. The 
ability to adapt more modern networking tools to student 
leadership activities seems like a good attribute for an 
intern. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: While others seem to like this 
idea, you are the one in charge of updating and checking 
the account. This ends up being more of a chore than you 
intended and becomes a weekly frustration for you. 
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iv. Academic attribute: More time on Facebook means less 
time studying. There are definitely better things you could 
be doing with your time. 
Scenario 3: Romantic Relationship 
 Neutral Condition. 
 You and your significant other have been together for several months. You met on 
campus and live in adjacent dormitories. You have several mutual friends with which you 
hang out. You are in different majors and come from different hometowns. You do a lot 
of things together, including going to the movies, attending sporting events, and studying. 
Your significant other has asked you to meet them for a talk this evening. 
 Uncertain Condition. 
 You and your significant other have been together for several months. You have 
not been able to see a lot of each other lately due to your busy schedules. You’ve heard 
through mutual friends that he/she has been unhappy with your relationship; however, 
he/she has also just experienced the death of a grandparent. Your significant other has 
asked you to meet them for a talk this evening. 
 Threatening Condition. 
 You and your significant other have been together for several months. You had a 
horrible fight recently and haven’t spoken for a couple of days. He/she has been spending 
a lot of time with a new friend that you haven’t met yet, and you feel threatened and 
betrayed. You are afraid that if you break up you will lose all of the mutual friends that 
you share, and this has you very stressed. You are still in love and would like to work 
things out, but your explosion may have ruined your chances. Your significant other has 
asked you to meet them for a talk this evening. 
1. Social choice pair 1: 
a. Choice A: “Break up with your significant other to make it 
impossible to get dumped” 
i. Social attribute: Your mutual friends would see this as a 
hasty move, and most of them would side with your 
significant other in the breakup. You’re going to have to 
start from scratch as far as finding a group of people to 
hang out with again. 
ii. Personal success attribute: You don’t have to suffer the 
humiliation of getting dumped, but your viewed as an idiot 
for not try to work out your relationship more beforehand. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: You would end up feeling 
lonely for quite some time. Not only are you out of a 
relationship, but you don’t have many friends left. 
iv. Academic attribute: To avoid having to deal with your 
emotions or lack of social life, you would spend all your 
time focusing on your schoolwork. You’re overall class 
performance actually improves as a result. 
b. Choice B: “Go out on the town to see how your other dating 
prospects look” 
i. Social attribute: While you would meet some new people 
and get flirted with while you’re out, the mutual friends 
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you share with your significant other don’t think that this is 
a good idea at all. 
ii. Personal success attribute: If your significant other hears 
that you’re checking out your other options, you’ll 
probably get dumped for sure.  
iii. Personal happiness attribute: You would get a sense of 
renewed confidence in your desirability as a partner. This 
makes you feel better about yourself. 
iv. Academic attribute: You would find that you like the 
attention and sense of control when going out on your own. 
This is going to detract from your schoolwork, as you 
spend more and more time focusing on how you look. 
2. Social choice pair 2: 
a. Choice A: “Don’t discuss your relationship with your mutual 
friends” 
i. Social attribute: While your friends think that you’re being 
prudish about your relationship your significant other is 
grateful that you don’t gossip about such things. 
ii. Personal success attribute: Your significant other 
acknowledges that you’re trying to protect your 
relationship, so also tries to work on it. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: It would be really nice to have 
a confidant that you could share your thoughts and fears 
with, especially since you and your significant other are 
communicating very openly. Hopefully you will be able to 
stop feeling like such a loner soon. 
iv. Academic attribute: Dealing with all of your emotional 
baggage on your own can be very stressful and distracting. 
You would find yourself not paying attention in class or 
getting homework done on time. 
b. Choice B: “Openly vent about your relationship to your mutual 
friends” 
i. Social attribute: This would make some of your friends 
understand your side of the relationship better. You would 
start to feel that if you and your significant other break up 
you would still have some friends left. 
ii. Personal success attribute: Your significant other would see 
this as a violation of their privacy. The odds that they will 
break up with you increase. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: While it feels good to get all 
your emotional baggage off your chest and have some 
people that sympathize with your situation, you are feeling 
awful about how upset your significant other is. 
iv. Academic attribute: All the additional drama that your 
friends add to the situation makes it impossible for you to 
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focus on class or your homework. You would start to fall 
behind in all your classes. 
3. Information-gathering pair 1: 
a. Choice A: “Ask a mutual friend to ‘feel-out’ your significant other 
to find out how they are feeling” 
i. Social attribute: This gets you one friend that feels 
entrusted, and thus closer to you and keeps the others from 
being too aware that you’re having any relationship 
concerns. 
ii. Personal success attribute: You not coming to your 
significant other yourself to talk about your relationship 
concerns does not sit well with them. They are now 
annoyed and making things worse for the two of you. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: You do find out some of the 
specific issues that your significant other is having a hard 
time with, and it feels good not to be in the dark, but 
knowing that you have irritated them has you worried. 
iv. Academic attribute: Since your friend is doing all the heavy 
lifting for you in your relationship, you are able to take 
your mind off of it for a bit and get some work done for 
class. 
b. Choice B: “Send your significant other an email asking them to tell 
you what’s on their mind” 
i. Social attribute: This puts the ball of dealing with any 
relationship issues in your significant other’s court, so you 
will have more time to hang out with friends and avoid the 
issue. 
ii. Personal success attribute: Your significant other finds an 
email an impersonal and cowardly way to try and discuss 
relationship issues. He/she wants to know why you’re not 
brave enough to confront him/her in person and is now 
angry. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: You feel like you’ve taken the 
appropriate steps to try and reach out to your significant 
other. You’re baffled by them not liking you reaching out 
by email and feel indignant. 
iv. Academic attribute: Since all you have to do is wait for 
your significant other’s reply you have plenty of time to 
work on stuff for class. 
4. Information-gathering pair 2: 
a. Choice A: “Talk to your significant other’s parents to see if they 
know anything about your relationship’s status” 
i. Social attribute: This would help your significant other’s 
family feel closer to you, which may help you when trying 
to deal with any relationship problems.  
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ii. Personal success attribute: Nobody likes being talked about 
behind their back, especially to their mother. Your 
significant other is very unhappy that you went to their 
parents first. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: You find out from your 
significant other’s parents that things are not as bad as they 
seem, so you’re feeling pretty good. 
iv. Academic attribute: Involving your significant other’s 
parents in your relationship is costing you a lot of time, as 
now they feel fine emailing and calling often. You really 
need to spend your nights studying and not talking with 
them. 
b. Choice B: “Login to your significant other’s email to see if you can 
find out how they’re feeling” 
i. Social attribute: You find out that one of your friends is 
encouraging your significant other to break up with you. 
While you’re trying to hide the fact that you know this, you 
can’t help but be hostile toward this friend, which comes 
across as you being a jerk. Now your other friends are 
angry with you too. 
ii. Personal success attribute: Your significant other doesn’t 
find out that you peeked at their email, and now you know 
exactly what’s bothering them, so next time you talk you’ll 
know exactly what to say to get your relationship back on 
track. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: You feel lousy about violating 
your significant other’s privacy and even more lousy about 
the kinds of things they were saying to friends about you. 
iv. Academic attribute: The things you read in your significant 
other’s email get you worrying about things you thought 
were okay before. Now you’re even more distracted and 
stressed in class. 
5. Threat reducing pair 1: 
a. Choice A: “Write a heart-felt letter about your true feelings to your 
significant other” 
i. Social attribute: This is done under the radar, so your 
situation with your friends doesn’t change. They still seem 
to be closer to your significant other than yourself. 
ii. Personal success attribute: Your significant other is touched 
by this gesture and agrees to work out any problems that 
you are having. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: It is really scary to expose 
yourself like that, even to somebody you trust, but your 
significant other’s positive response has made it worth it. 
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iv. Academic attribute: You get so caught up in the emotion of 
your relationship that you totally blow off preparing for 
classes for a few days. 
b. Choice B: “Buy your significant other an extravagant gift that they 
have been wanting” 
i. Social attribute: All of your friends ooh and ahh over the 
gesture, which makes you rather popular for a short while.  
ii. Personal success attribute: This will certainly appease your 
significant other for a while and get them to ignore any 
concerns they are having about your relationship.  
iii. Personal happiness attribute: You are feeling really good 
about making your significant other happy. You just hope 
that this will fix things rather than just cover them up for a 
while. 
iv. Academic attribute: This puts your relationship worries 
aside for a short time, so you can really focus on doing well 
in your classes. 
6. Threat reducing pair 2: 
a. Choice A: “Devote all of your free time to making your significant 
other happy” 
i. Social attribute: You start being viewed by your friends as 
more of a partner than a person. Your oozing devotion 
turns them off and they start spending less and less time 
with you. 
ii. Personal success attribute: Your significant other loves the 
new found attention, and starts to think that any problems 
they were having with the relationship were just in their 
head. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: Your start to feel bitter about 
not receiving as much attention and affection as you’re 
receiving, so despite your partner’s improved feelings 
about your relationship, yours are getting worse. 
iv. Academic attribute: You spending all your study and class 
time doting on your significant other, which means that 
your grades are dropping. 
b. Choice B: “Call your significant other and convince them to work 
on your relationship” 
i. Social attribute: Your friends are aware that you’re trying 
to work things out with your significant other, so they give 
you some space so you can do so. This means your not 
spending much time with them. 
ii. Personal success attribute: Your significant other 
appreciates your devotion to your relationship so agrees to 
keep working on things. You may not have fixed the 




iii. Personal happiness attribute: Your feeling very optimistic 
about your relationship and hope that you can keep 
convincing your significant other to stay together by sheer 
force of will. 
iv. Academic attribute: Your relationship becomes your 
number one priority, which means that you are not doing 
well in class. 
7. No action pair 1: 
a. Choice A: “Give your significant other some space and let them 
come to you” 
i. Social attribute: Giving your significant other space means 
also isolating yourself from the mutual friends you share, 
so you’re spending a lot of time alone. 
ii. Personal success attribute: Your significant other is just as 
unmotivated to try and work things out as you are. The 
problems you have are left undealt with and animosity 
grows between you. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: You have no idea how your 
significant other is feeling now, and you are stress out and 
worried that they are going to dump you. 
iv. Academic attribute: To distract yourself from thinking 
about your relationship you delve into your school work. 
You actually start to improve in class. 
b. Choice B: “Actively avoid your significant other hoping the issue 
will go away” 
i. Social attribute: Avoiding your significant other means 
avoiding your mutual friends, which is pretty much all your 
friends, so you’re spending a lot of time alone. 
ii. Personal success attribute: While your significant other 
can’t get you face-to-face to dump you, they are really 
furious at how hard it is to see you and talk. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: You’re feeling pretty 
desperate about your relationship situation and are almost 
certain that you’ve caused a breakup. 
iv. Academic attribute: Not hanging out with your significant 
other or friends does give you more time to study for class. 
You actually get a project done ahead of time. 
8. No action pair 2: 
a. Choice A: “Make up some excuse for why you can not meet to talk 
tonight” 
i. Social attribute: You can’t let any of your mutual friends 
know that you were lying about not being able to meet, so 




ii. Personal success attribute: This just delays the inevitable 
conversation you’re going to have to have with your 
significant other and gets them irritated to boot. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: You do not feel good about 
lying to your significant other and wish that you could be 
less of a coward when it comes to confronting emotional 
issues. 
iv. Academic attribute: You gave your significant other the 
excuse that you have a paper due in class tomorrow, so you 
decide to actually go to the library and work anyway. You 
don’t get your term paper done, but you at least get it 
started. 
b. Choice B: “Intentionally miss meeting with your significant other 
and tell them you forgot when they ask later on” 
i. Social attribute: This sort of snub is viewed as 
inconsiderate by all of your mutual friends, who decide to 
start snubbing you in turn. 
ii. Personal success attribute: Your significant other is irate 
that you could simply forget about meeting with them, and 
the status of your relationship gets way worse. 
iii. Personal happiness attribute: You managed to avoid having 
a difficult and emotional conversation, but you’ve only 
made things worse for the next conversation. 
iv. Academic attribute: You’re so busy dodging the 
relationship bullet that you become completely distracted 


























This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different feelings and 
emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that 
word. Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now. Use the following scale to 
record your answers: 
1   2   3   4   5  
very slightly  a little   moderately  quite a bit  extremely 
or not at all 
 
Positive: determined, enthusiastic, excited, proud, strong 
General Negative: ashamed, sad, guilty, upset, hostile 
Uncertain: nervous, not in control, having intrusive thoughts, distressed, worried 




































Speilberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory and Fear Survey Schedule 
Speilberger State Anxiety Inventory: Spielberger, C. C. (1983). Manual for the State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. 
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given next.  
Read each statement and then press the button indicating how you feel right now, that is, 
at this moment.  There are no right or wrong answers.  Do not spend too much time on 
any one statement but give the answer which seems to describe your present feelings 
best. 
I feel calm 
I feel secure 
I am tense 
I feel strained 
I feel at ease 
I feel upset 
I am presently worrying over possible misfortunes 
I feel satisfied 
I feel frightened 
I feel comfortable 
I feel self-confident 
I feel nervous 
I am jittery 
I feel indecisive 
I am relaxed 
I feel content 
I am worried 
I feel confused 
I feel steady 
I feel pleasant 
Speilberger Trait Anxiety Inventory: Spielberger, C. C. (1983). Manual for the State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. 
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves follow.  Read 
each statement and then press the appropriate button to indicate how you generally feel.  
There are no right or wrong answers.  Do not spend too much time on any one statement 
but give the answer which seems to describe how you generally feel. 
I feel pleasant 
I feel nervous and restless 
I feel satisfied with myself 
I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be 
I feel like a failure 
I feel rested 
I am "calm, cool, and collected" 
I feel that difficulties are piling up so that I cannot overcome them 
I worry too much over something that really doesn't matter 
I am happy 
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I have disturbing thoughts 
I lack self-confidence 
I feel secure 
I make decisions easily 
I feel inadequate 
I am content 
Some unimportant thought runs through my mind and bothers me 
I take disappointments so keenly that I can't put them out of my mind 
I am a steady person 
I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think over my recent concerns and interests 
 
Fear Survey Schedule: Braun, P. R. & Reynolds, D. J. (1969). A factor analysis of a 100-
item fear survey inventory. Behavior Research Therapy, 7, 4. 
Rate the level of your fear of each of the items following.  Describe how you would feel 
if they actually happened to you or were actually present near you. 
Noise of vacuum cleaners 
Being cut 
Being alone 
Speaking before a group 
Dead bodies 
Loud noises 
Being a passenger in a car 
Driving a car 
Auto accidents 
People with deformities 
Being in a strange place 
Riding a roller coaster 
Being in closed places 
Thunder 
Falling down 
One person bullying another 








Being physically assaulted 
Failing a test 
Not being a success 
Losing a job 
Making mistakes 










Seeing other people injected 
Illness 
Angry people 







Witnessing surgical operations 




Seeing a fight 




Being a passenger in an airplane 
Arguing with parents 
Meeting someone for the first time 
Being misunderstood 
Crowded places 
Being a leader 
Losing control 
Being with drunks 
Being self-conscious 
People in authority 
People who seem insane 
Boating 
God 









Journeys by train 
Journeys by bus 
Feeling angry 
Dull weather 
Large open spaces 
Cuts 
Tough looking people 
Birds 
Being watched while working 
Guns 
Dirt 
Being in an elevator 
Parting from friends 
Feeling rejected by others 
Odors 
Feeling disapproved of 
Being ignored 
Premature heart beats 
Nude men 
Nude women 
Unclean silverware in restaurants 
Dirty restrooms 




























Instructions for Reading the Decision Scenarios 
 You are about to read a description of a leadership position that is in a certain 
situation. We would like you to imagine yourself as the person described. Try to mentally 
image yourself in their position with their concerns and emotions. It is very important 
that you try to adopt their role as much as possible for the following task. After reading 
the description, please take a few minutes to imagine yourself as that person in that 










































Instructions for Making the Two-Choice Decisions 
 Maintaining who you are and your current situation, please choose one of the two 














































Time to Make a Decision Analyses by Order 
 First Scenario 
 Hierarchical multiple regressions were conducted using STAI-S, STAI-T, and 
FSS scores as predictors for time to make a decision for each decision context. For each 
analysis, STAI-S scores were entered in the first step, followed by STAI-T scores in the 
second and FSS scores in the third (this order was chosen after each possible order was 
ran and all were found to yield the same results, which supports the following findings 
being true findings and not type I errors due to inflation from colinearity). Hierarchical 
regressions further help to control for colinearity by including all shared covariance with 
the first entered predictor, leaving subsequent predictors unique.  
 For neutral contexts, all three steps of the regression model were found to be 
significant, F(3, 31) = 3.18, p = .04, R2 = .17. This was largely driven by STAI-S scores 
predicting shorter decision times and STAI-T scores predicting longer decision times. For 
uncertain contexts, none of the steps of the regression model were found to be significant. 
Lastly, for threatening contexts, only the first two steps of the regression model were 
found to be significant, F(2, 30) = 4.59, p = .02, R2 = .18. The pattern of effects here were 
the same as for the neutral context scenarios. Unstandardized slopes for these models can 
be found in Table 11.  
Table 11. 
Unstandardized slopes for the regression model predicting time to make a decision from 
anxiety type for the first decision scenario. 
 Neutral* Uncertain Threatening* 
Intercept 56 3 29 
STAI-S -1** -.5ns -.9* 
STAI-T .1* .8 ns .9† 
FSS -.07 ns .04 ns .02 ns 
** indicates significance at the " = .01 level 
* indicates significance at the " = .05 level 
† indicates a statistical trend (p = .06) 
 
 Second Scenario 
 Analyses for the second decision scenario were the same as for the first. For 
neutral contexts, all three steps of the regression model were found to be significant, F(3, 
25) = 3.47, p = .03, R2 = .21. This time, only STAI-S scores reliably predicted shorter 
decision times. For uncertain and threatening contexts, none of the steps of the regression 
model were found to be significant. Unstandardized slopes for these models can be found 
in Table 12.  
Table 12. 
Unstandardized slopes for the regression model predicting time to make a decision from 
anxiety type for the second decision scenario. 
 Neutral* Uncertain Threatening 
Intercept 35 19 25 
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STAI-S -1** -.5 ns .2 ns 
STAI-T .04ns .6 ns .02 ns 
FSS .1 ns .001 ns -.03 ns 
** indicates significance at the " = .01 level 
* indicates significance at the " = .05 level 
 
 Third Scenario 
 Analyses for the third decision scenario were the same as for the first and second. 
For all contexts, no steps of the regression models were found to be significant. 
Unstandardized slopes for these models can be found in Table 13. Overall, statistical 
trends found for the slopes support what was found in the first and second decision 
scenarios, despite the overall model fits not being significant. 
Table 13.  
Unstandardized slopes for the regression model predicting time to make a decision from 
anxiety type for the third decision scenario. 
 Neutral Uncertain Threatening 
Intercept 12 52 34 
STAI-S -.7* -.3ns -.8† 
STAI-T .8* -.6ns -.03ns 
FSS .002ns .02ns .07 ns 
* indicates significance at the " = .05 level 


























Number of Attributes Considered Analyses by Order 
 First Scenario 
 Hierarchical multiple regressions were conducted using STAI-S, STAI-T, and 
FSS scores as predictors for number of attributes considered for each decision scenario 
context. For each analysis, STAI-S scores were entered in the first step, followed by 
STAI-T scores in the second and FSS scores in the third (this order was chosen for the 
same reasons as mentioned in the time to make a decision analyses).  
 For neutral contexts, all three steps of the regression model were found to be 
significant, F(3, 31) = 3.13, p = .04, R2 = .17. This model was driven by STAI-S scores 
predicting less consideration of attributes. For uncertain and threatening contexts, none of 
the steps of the regression model were found to be significant. Unstandardized slopes for 
these models can be found in Table 14.  
Table 14. 
Unstandardized slopes for the regression model predicting amount of information 
considered prior to a decision from anxiety type for the first decision scenario. 
 Neutral* Uncertain Threatening 
Intercept 5.10 -1.15 2.33 
STAI-S -.15** -.05ns -.06ns 
STAI-T .11ns .09ns .05ns 
FSS -.01ns .01ns .003ns 
** indicates significance at the " = .01 level 
 Second Scenario 
 Analyses for the second decision scenario were the same as for the first. For 
neutral contexts, all three steps of the regression model were found to show a statistical 
trend, F(3, 25) = 2.69, p = .07, R2 = .15. For uncertain context, the first two steps of the 
regression model were found to show a statistical trend, F(2, 29) = 2.86, p = .07, R2 = .11. 
This was again driven by STAI-S scores predicting less consideration of attributes per 
decision and STAI-T scores predicting more. For threatening contexts, none of the steps 
of the regression model were found to be significant. Unstandardized slopes for these 
models can be found in Table 15.  
Table 15. 
Unstandardized slopes for the regression model predicting amount of information 
considered prior to a decision from anxiety type for the second decision scenario. 
 Neutral* Uncertain* Threatening 
Intercept 3.73 2.65 .74 
STAI-S -.03ns -.11* .03ns 
STAI-T -.12* .10† .02ns 
FSS .02* -.003ns .00ns 
* indicates significance at the " = .05 level 
† indicates a statistical trend (p = .08)  
 
 Third Scenario 
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 Analyses for the third decision scenario were the same as for the first and second. 
For neutral contexts, the first two steps of the regression model showed a statistical trend, 
F(2, 31) = 2.56, p = .09, R2 = .09. The same pattern of results is reflected here. For 
uncertain contexts, the model with three steps showed a statistical trend, F(3, 29) = 2.34, 
p = .09, R2 = .11. Finally, for threatening contexts, only the first step of the regression 
model showed a statistical trend, F(1, 26) = 3.53, p = .07, R2 = .09. Unstandardized 
slopes for these models can be found in Table 16.  
Table 16. 
Unstandardized slopes for the regression model predicting amount of information 
considered prior to a decision from anxiety type for the third decision scenario.  
 Neutral* Uncertain* Threatening 
Intercept 1.23 4.62 3.37 
STAI-S -.09* -.02ns -.11† 
STAI-T .09* -.11* .003ns 
FSS -.002ns .01ns .01ns 
* indicates significance at the " = .05 level 
† indicates a statistical trend (p = .09) 
